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GETTING A FULL BITE OF THE APPLE: WHEN
SHOULD THE DOCTRINE OF ISSUE
PRECLUSION MAKE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE OR ARBITRAL
DETERMINATION BINDING IN
A COURT OF LAW?
JAY CARLISLE*
INTRODUCTION
=toW York courts have recently expanded' the scope of collateral es-
oppel,2 also known as issue preclusion,3 by applying this doctrine to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law: A.B., University of
California at Los Angeles; J.D., University of California at Davis. This article is dedi-
cated to Dean Robert B. Fleming and Dean Janet Johnson of Pace University. My col-
leagues at Pace Law School, particularly Dr. Josephine Y. King, know how much I
appreciate their support and assistance. I also wish to thank Professor David Siegel for
his help in the initial stages of this article, Professor Maurice Rosenberg for his thought-
ful review of an earlier draft and Professor Oscar Chase for his criticism and
encouragement.
1. See Siegel, Expanding Applications of Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion), 309
N.Y. St. L. Dig. 1 (1985).
2. Collateral estoppel is one of a number of doctrines collectively referred to as "res
judicata." See 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice, C 5011.08,
at 50-95 (1985) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments). The principle of collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of factual issues decided by a court in a prior suit. It is to
be distinguished from direct estoppel, which prohibits relitigation of issues actually liti-
gated and determined in the first action when a second action is brought on the same
claim. See F. James, Jr. & G. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure § 11.16 (3d ed. 1985); D.
Siegel, New York Practice § 443 (1978). A narrower species of res judicata, collateral
estoppel basically "precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceed-
ing an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party
or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same." Ryan
v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826
(1984). Its typical application occurs when one of the parties to a civil action argues that
preclusive effect should be given to one or more issues determined in an earlier civil
action between the same parties in the same jurisdiction. Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments, Introduction at 1 (1982).
The United States Supreme Court recently explained the difference between collateral
estoppel and res judicata in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979):
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars
a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause
of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the sec-
ond action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit
precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of
the first action.
Id at 326 n.5 (quoting IB J. Moore, J.D. Lucas & T.S. Currier, Federal Practice C
0.405[l], at 622-24 (2d ed. 1974)). See generally Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
153 (1979) (modern formulation of issue preclusion), Cromwell v. County of Sacramento,
94 U.S. 351, 352-55 (1876) (setting forth fundamental historical differences between resjudicata and collateral estoppel); IB J. Moore, J.D. Lucas & T.S. Currier, Federal Prac-
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the results of administrative hearings,4 arbitrations, 5 and third party liti-
gations6 . Traditionally, issue preclusion is applied when a question of
fact or law resolved in a prior litigation is raised in a subsequent proceed-
ing based on a different cause of action.7 The judgment in the prior fo-
tice, § 0.405(1) (3d ed. 1984) (discussing issue preclusion in federal courts) [hereinafter
lB Moore]; King, Collateral Estoppel and Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation in New York,
36 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 11 & nn.72-79 (1967) (distinguishing issue preclusion from resjudicata). Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 St. John's L. Rev. 165, 166
(1969) ("[c]ollateral estoppel falls into the category of partial res judicata because its
binding effect is limited to certain of the issues formerly in dispute, rather than extending
to the entire controversy").
3. Modem approaches usually refer to both direct and collateral estoppel as "issue
preclusion." See generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Ch. 3, introductory note
at 131 (1982) (distinguishing direct and collateral estoppel).
The New York State Court of Appeals has adopted this terminology. See American
Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 184, 189 n.2, 371 N.E.2d 798, 801 n.2, 401 N.Y.S.2d 36, 39 n.2
(1977). But see Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 485, 386
N.E.2d 1328, 1331, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310-11 (1979) (court uses res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel terminology).
Consistent use of the terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" will help clarify
the distinction between the two concepts in judicial opinions and will minimize the confu-
sion created when "res judicata" is used to describe both of them.
4. See Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 1012, 478 N.E.2d 195, 196,
489 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (1985) (administrative findings given preclusive effect, thereby
preventing plaintiff from litigating issue of defendant's negligence in subsequent lawsuit);
Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 502, 467 N.E.2d 487, 491, 478 N.Y.S.2d
823, 828 (1984) (preclusive effect given to administrative findings made in an unemploy-
ment insurance proceeding to estop plaintiff from maintaining a plenary damage suit for
slander, false arrest, and wrongful discharge); Liss v. Trans Auto Sys., 109 A.D.2d 430,
434-35, 492 N.Y.S.2d 394, 398 (Ist Dep't 1985) (preclusive effect given to administrative
findings), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.Y.2d 15, 496 N.E.2d 851, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831(1986). Administrative determinations of New York State agencies also have been given
preclusive effect in federal courts. See Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville,
752 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Hill v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 786 F.2d 550, 554
(2d Cir. 1986) (court refused to give administrative determination preclusive effect be-
cause defendant was not accorded full and fair opportunity to litigate claim).
5. See Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 749, 481 N.E.2d 560, 561, 492 N.Y.S.2d
20, 21 (1985) (issue preclusion applied to arbitral determination to bar plaintiff from
relitigating cause of injury); Fischer v. Broady, 118 A.D.2d 827, 828, 500 N.Y.S.2d 311,
313 (2d Dep't 1986) (court grants preclusive effect to arbitral determination); Guarantee
Ins. Co. v. D'Alleva, 113 A.D.2d 941, 941-42, 493 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633 (2d Dep't 1985)
(arbitral determination given preclusive effect in subsequent litigation); Hendershot v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 101 A.D.2d 649, 475 N.Y.S.2d 558 (3d Dep't 1984) (same).
6. Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 453, 482 N.E.2d 63, 65-66, 492
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-87 (1985) (issue preclusion applied to third-party litigation); Koch v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 554, 468 N.E.2d 1, 4, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166
(1984) (same), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985); Schaeffer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 113
A.D.2d 827, 829, 493 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502 (2d Dep't 1984) (same). But see Liss v. Trans
Auto Sys., 68 N.Y.2d 15, 22-23, 496 N.E.2d 851, 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (1986)
(court refused to give preclusive effect to determination of administrative proceeding
when defendant in second action was not party to previous action).
7. See Capital Tel. Co. v. Pattersonville Tel. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 11, 17, 436 N.E.2d 461,
463, 451 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (1982) (collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issue determined
in previous action); Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808-09, 441
N.Y.S.2d 49, 50-51 (1981) (same); Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52, 55, 429
N.E.2d 104, 106, 444 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (1981) (collateral estoppel refers to the preclu-
ISSUE PRECLUSION
rum precludes a redetermination of the issues necessary to the outcome
of the first action.8 Issue preclusion minimizes inconsistent determina-
tions of factual issues among different forums,9 and promotes judicial
economy.1" The doctrine is customarily considered in terms of funda-
mental notions of justice and fairness." While some courts have used
"res judicata" as a catch-all termI2 for both claim preclusion' 3 and issue
sive effect given to the determination of matters actually litigated in one action when
those matters are raised in a subseqent action based upon a different claim.) See generally,
5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, 5011.14, 5011.24, & n. 223; Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982); 0. Chase, Civil Litigation in New York,
§ 21.03 (1983); Chase, Trends and Cross-Trends in Res Judicata, N.Y.L.J. May 25, 1982,
at 1, col. 1.
8. Traditionally, the application of issue preclusion required that an issue of fact,
necessary and essential to the judgment, had been actually litigated and determined by a
final judgment. See Commissioners of the State Ins. v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590, 595, 148
N.E.2d 136, 138-39, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795,798 (1958). The Court of Appeals has e.'panded
application of the doctiine to include matters that were necessarily decided in the prior
action, though not actually litigated. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71,
246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969).
9. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 74, 246 N.E.2d 725, 730-31, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 962 (1969) (issue preclusion reduces "the number of inconsistent results
which are always a blemish on a judicial system."); Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d
105, 107-08, 218 N.E.2d 688, 689, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1966) (" 'One who has had his
day in court should not be permitted to litigate the question anew.' ") (quoting Israel v.
Wood Dolson Co., I N.Y.2d 116, 119, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1. 4 (1956));
New York State Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Holland Laundry, Inc., 294 N.Y. 480, 493, 63 N.E.2d
68, 74 (1945) ("'The fundamental principle governing the general doctrine of [issue pre-
clusion]' is 'that a party shall not be heard a second time on an issue which he has once
been called upon and permitted to try and contest.'") (quoting Hendrick v. Biggar, 209
N.Y. 440, 444, 103 N.E. 763, 764 (1913)). See generally, Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments § 27 (1982) (discussing issue preclusion); D. Siegel, supra note 2, §§ 443, 457
(same); Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments" Issue Preclusion and
Related Problems, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 564, 574-75 (1981) (same); Scott, Collateral Estop-
pel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942) (same).
10. See Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 455, 482 N.E.2d 63, 67, 492
N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985); Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808,
441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (1981). See also University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3226
(1986) (collateral estoppel serves both the parties' interest in avoiding the expense and
trouble of repetitous litigation and the public's interest in conserving judicial resources).
11. See Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52, 55, 429 N.E.2d 104, 106, 444 N.Y.
S.2d 585, 587 (1981) (applying full and fair opportunity test); Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53
N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (1981) (issue preclusion must
be analyzed in terms of fairness); People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d. 58, 64-65, 417 N.E.2d 518,
522, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 228 (1980) (issue preclusion not to be mechanically applied and
must occasionally yield to questions of fairness); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d
65, 73, 246 N.E.2d 725, 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 962 (1969) ("No one would contend that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied rigidly."). See generally 5 J. Wein-
stein, H. Korn, & A. Miller, supra note 2 at 5011.42; Currie, Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppel. Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281, 285-89 (1957); Herman,
The New York Rulemaking Process: Rulemaking Procedures in New York, 47 Alb. L.
Rev. 1051, 1075-80 (1983); Rosenberg, supra note 2 at 194. Commentators, however, are
skeptical of whether the concern of the courts over due process and fairness is manifested
when applying the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Note, Preclu-
sion of Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1551 (1979); Note,
Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1496-1501 (1974).
12. In its broadest sense, the term "res judicata" has been used to refer to a variety of
1986]
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preclusion14, the doctrines have different origins"' and serve distinct
functions. 16
concepts dealing with the preclusive effects of a judgment on subsequent litigation. See
James & Hazard, supra note 2 at § 11.31; 1B Moore, supra note 2, 0.405(1); 5 J. Wein-
stein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, f 5011.10-5011.22; Cleary, Res Judicata Re-
examined, 57 Yale L.J. 339 (1948); Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741
(1976); Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 Ind.
L.J. 615 (1980); Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 St. Louis U.L.J. 29 (1964); Note, The
Expansion ofResJudicata in New York, 48 Alb. L. Rev. 210, 213-15 n.13 (1983) (author:
Ann M. Williams) [hereinafter Res Judicata in N. Y]; Note, Developments In The Law
Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818 (1952) [hereinafter Developments].
13. Claim preclusion is the doctrine that "once a claim is brought to a final conclu-
sion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are
barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy." Gia-
camazzo v. Moreno, 94 A.D.2d 369, 371, 464 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (1st Dep't 1983) (citing
Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 29-30, 379 N.E.2d 172, 175-76, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648-49
(1978)). But see City of New York v. Caristo Const. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 819, 820-21, 466
N.E.2d 143, 144, 477 N.Y.S. 603, 603-04 (1984) (provision in judgment that dismissal
was without prejudice saved it from claim preclusion under "transactional analysis" ap-
proach); Res Judicata in New York, supra note 12, at 232 n.74; see also Santangelo v.
YMCA 100 A.D.2d 581, 582, 473 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (2d Dep't 1984) (transactional anal-
ysis applied to unappealed order granting summary judgment); Cimino v. Cimino, 98
A.D.2d 706, 706, 469 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (2d Dep't 1983) (transactional analysis applied
to divorce proceeding); Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 119 Misc. 2d 663, 666, 464 N.Y.S.2d
953, 955 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (transactional analysis applied in breach of contract action),
modified, 111 A.D.2d 17, 488 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1st Dep't 1985), aff'd, 68 N.Y.2d 702, 497
N.E.2d 675, 506 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1986); Shartrand v. Town of Glenville, 118 Misc. 2d 128,
130, 460 N.Y.S.2d 220, 222 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (transactional analysis applied to action in-
volving property damage). See generally 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note
2, 11 5011.10-5011.22 (discussing res judicata).
14. For a discussion of issue preclusion, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
15. Although the concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion appear in English
common law, each doctrine has a different origin. Claim preclusion is a Roman law con-
cept while issue preclusion originated in Germanic law. The notion that a judgment has
an independent preclusive effect is characteristic of Roman law while early Germanic law
permitted a subsequent action and new judgment. See Developments, supra note 12, at
820-21 nn. 1-6. See generally Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res
Judicata, 35 U. Ill. L. Rev. 41, 41-42 (1940) (translating Seelman, Der Rechtszug im
alteren deutschen Recht, 107 Gierkes Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats - und Recht-
sgeschichte 90, 103, 198-99 (1911)).
16. See Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165
N.E. 456, 457 (1929). Distinguishing claim preclusion from issue preclusion, Judge Car-
dozo stated:
A judgment in one action is conclusive in a later one not only as to any matters
actually litigated therein, but also as to any that might have been so litigated,
when the two causes of action have such a measure of identity that a different
judgment in the second would destroy or impair rights or interests established
by the first. It is not conclusive, however, to the same extent when the two
causes of action are different, not in form only, but in the rights and interests
affected. The estoppel is limited in such circumstances to the point actually
determined.
Id., 165 N.E.2d at 457 (citations omitted). The first quoted sentence describes the doc-
trine of claim preclusion. The next two sentences describe the doctrine of issue preclu-
sion. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, § 457 at 605.
The distinction between the doctrines was recognized by the United States Supreme
Court as early as 1877. See Cromwell v. County of Sacramento., 94 U.S. 351, 352-53
(1877). See generally Hazard, supra note 9, at 580-86 (distinguishing collateral estoppel
1986] ISSUE PRECLUSION
Recent New York cases have affirmed summary judgments on the ba-
sis of issue preclusion, in effect allowing prior administrative and arbitral
issue determination to bar litigation of claims in a judicial forum.' The
high volume of actions filed each year in New York courts 8 may furnish
some judges with an incentive to use issue preclusion as a means of con-
trolling their calendars by prohibiting some parties from relitigating deci-
sive issues determined against them in administrative and arbitral
forums.19 In this sense, some judges may be inclined to conserve judicial
resources and reduce burdensome caseloads by relaxing their demands
on traditional requirements of fairness, as embodied in the "full and fair
opportunity" test.20
from claim preclusion); Vestal, Extent of Claim Preclusion, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1968)
(illustrating distinction between claim preclusion and issue preclusion); Vestal, Proce-
dural Aspects of Res Judicata/Preclusion, 1 U. Tol. L. Rev. 15, 28 (1969) (same); Res
Judicata in N. Y., supra note 12, at 216-17 nn.17-22 (discussing Schuylkill Fuel).
17. See Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 748-49, 481 N.E.2d 560, 560-61, 492
N.Y.S.2d 20, 20-21 (1985); Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 1012, 478
N.E.2d 195, 196, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (1985); Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d
494, 502, 467 N.E.2d 487, 491, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 827 (1984); see also Green v. Ingber, 80
A.D.2d 928, 928, 437 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (3d Dep't 1981) (administrative board's decision
entitled to binding effect within state's courts so long as it was within board's power to
make determination); Bernstein v. Birch Wathen School, 71 A.D.2d 129, 132, 421
N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (1st Dep't 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 932, 434 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1980) (the
principles of issue preclusion are applicable to the quasi-judicial determinations of admin-
istrative agencies and are, if final, binding in a court of law); 0. Chase, CPLR Manual
§ 25.04(e) (1985) (issue preclusion applicable to arbitral determinations). The application
of issue preclusion to administrative and arbitral determinations in subsequent court pro-
ceedings is to be distinguished from the preclusive effect given by one administrative body
to the prior decision of another administrative body. This application should also be
distinguished from the preclusive effect of a judicial determination in a subsequent arbi-
tral proceeding. See Newsday, Inc. v. Ross, 80 A.D.2d 1, 5, 437 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379-80
(2d Dep't 1981); Note, Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel Effect of a Court Determination
in a Subsequent Arbitration, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 1029, 1048-56 (1981) (author: Melissa Hope
Biren); see also infra note 177 and accompanying text.
18. Over 2.5 million actions are filed each year in New York courts. New York
Times, Jan. 6, 1986, at B1, col. 3; Letter from Alyson M. Brenner, Office of the Director
of Programs and Planning of the State of New York Unified Court System Office of
Management Support (Office of Court Administration) to Professor Jay C. Carlisle, dated
October 29, 1986 (computer breakdown of actions filed in New York State Courts) (avail-
able in the files of Fordham Law Review).
19. Courts have been using issue preclusion to support the granting of defendants'
motions for summary judgment. See supra notes 11, 17 and accompanying text. See also
King, supra note 2, at 2 (application of issue preclusion "could result in minimizing de-
lays and repetitious litigation").
20. The Court of Appeals first explicitly adopted the "full and fair opportunity" test
in Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955,
959 (1969).
In Schwartz a judgment was granted in favor of a passenger in an action against the
operators of two colliding vehicles. See id. at 75-76, 246 N.E.2d at 731-32, 298 N.Y.S.2d
at 963-64. In a second action the operator of the first vehicle sued the operator of the
second vehicle and the latter was permitted to use a prior finding of negligence against
both drivers in order to preclude the lawsuit. See id. at 74-75, 246 N.E.2d at 731, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 963. Under the law of contributory negligence in effect at the time, both
drivers were barred from any recovery. See id. at 75-76, 246 N.E.2d at 731-32, 298
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Satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity test requires a comparison
of the procedural opportunities available to the litigants in the initial and
subsequent forums.2 ' Indeed, the New York State Court of Appeals has
stated that issue preclusion cannot be invoked if dissimilar procedural
opportunities could result in the same issue being determined differently
in the second forum.22 Implicit in the Court of Appeals' decision to apply
N.Y.S.2d at 963-64. The Court of Appeals noted that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
should not be applied rigidly and stressed that each case should be decided on its facts.
See id. at 73, 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 962. Nonetheless, the court observed
that its recent decisions had recognized the need for a prompt and non-repetitious judicial
system. See id. at 69, 246 N.E.2d at 727, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 958. The court went on to
state:
New York Law has now reached the point where there are but two necessary
requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of [issue preclusion]. There
must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior
action and is decisive of the present action, and, second, there must have been a
full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling.
Id. at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
The court explained that common sense and the realities of the usual collision accident
established identity of the issues, see id. at 74-75, 246 N.E.2d at 731, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 962-
63, but it did not set forth any guidelines to delineate which issue in the second action
was, or was not, foreclosed by the prior judgment. By its failure to critically analyze this
question, which had long been one of the most difficult problems in the application of
issue preclusion, the court, in effect, implied that the "identity of issue" prerequisite
should be of less importance than the "full and fair opportunity" requirement. While the
court's approach might prevent much legal talent and energy from being dissipated in
litigating the interminable procession of motor vehicle negligence cases, it also portended
a greater emphasis on judicial economy. The shift in emphasis is underscored by the
court's discussion of the public's concern about the great delays in accident litigation.
See id. at 74, 246 N.E.2d at 731, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 962. Surely, the court was hinting that
it would flexibly apply the identity of issue requirement, not only to prevent inconsistent
judgments, but to reduce the heavy caseloads that were becoming increasingly burden-
some to the judicial system. See id., 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
While acknowledging that each case must be decided on its own facts, the Court of
Appeals enumerated several factors to be considered in determining whether a party has
had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in the earlier action. Although not intending
to formulate an exclusive list, the court suggested that the following factors be consid-
ered: "the size of the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative, the
extent of the litigation, the competence and experience of counsel, the availability of new
evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences in the applicable law and fore-
seeability of future litigations." Id. at 72, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. For a
discussion of other factors, see A. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicat-
ing Bodies, 54 Geo. L.J. 857, 885-89 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 27-29
(1982).
21. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 555 n.4, 468 N.E.2d 1, 4-5
n.4, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166-67 n.4 (1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29
(1982)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985).
22. See id. at 555 n.4, 468 N.E.2d at 4-5 n.4, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 166-67 (citing Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments § 29 (1982)). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979) ("might be unfair to apply offensive estoppel [when] the second
action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that
could readily cause a different result") (footnote omitted). When administrative forums
have substantially different procedural rules, the doctrine has not been applied. See Board
of Educ. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 106 A.D.2d 364, 365-66, 482
N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-97 (2d Dep't 1984) (issue preclusion not granted to prior administra-
tion because complainant's allegation that she had been subjected to a racial slur was only
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this doctrine to administrative hearings and arbitral determinations,
however, is the notion that the full and fair opportunity test can be satis-
fied without these procedural safeguards. While the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments supports granting preclusive effect to administrative
determinations,23 other commentators have questioned the applicability
of issue preclusion to arbitral and administrative proceedings conducted
without pre-trial discovery or strict adherence to rules of evidence.24
briefly explored); see also Willer v. New York State Bd. of Regents, 101 A.D.2d 937, 938,
475 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (3d Dep't 1984) (issue preclusion effect not given because prior
administrative hearing did not give petitioner full and fair opportunity to litigate his
claim).
23. Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 83 (1982); see also University of Tenn. v.
Elliot, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3227 (1986) ("Federal courts must give the [state] agency's
factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in state courts.").
24. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, § 456. Professor Siegel noted that "one hears criti-
cism of the [Ryan] case... because many lawyers believe that an administrative proceed-
ing - at least one allowed impact in subsequent judicial proceedings - can't be said to be of
the kind contemplated by the 'full and fair opportunity' requirement." Id. at 95 (Supp.
1985). He further noted that since rules of evidence do not apply in administrative hear-
ings and disclosure devices are unavailable, "rights jealously guarded in direct litigation
can lose sanctity when asserted in the format of a collateral estoppel issue." Id. See
Connolly & Moorehead, Res Judicata Effect of Rulings by State Administrative Agencies,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 1985, at 1, col.1; Schwartz, Administrative Res Judicata, Vol. 193,
N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1985, at 2, col. 2-3; Hoguet, Recent Appeals Court Cases Change Scope
of Collateral Estoppel, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 1984 at 5, col. 1).
In December 1985, the Committee on Labor and Unemployment Law of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York recommended legislation to limit the preclusive
effect of decisions made by some Administrative Law Judges. The Committee on Labor
and Employment Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Unemploy-
ment Insurance Decisions and the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, 40 The Record 738, 748
(1985) [hereinafter The Record]. The Committee proposed that
section 623 of New York State Labor Law be amended as follows: Renumber
present Section 623 as subdivision (1) and add a new subdivision (2) to read,
"Notwithstanding the above, no finding of fact or law contained in a decision of
an Administrative Law Judge, the Appeal Board or a Court, obtained under
this article, shall be deemed preclusive in any other action or proceeding, ex-
cepting proceedings under this article."
Id. at 748-49.
The Committee's recommendation, which was based on a report criticizing the Court
of Appeals decision in Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478
N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984), concluded that preclusive effect should not be given to administra-
tive findings made in unemployment insurance proceedings:
It is the Committee's view (a) that unemployment insurance proceedings,
designed for quickly determining the narrow issue of benefit eligibility, do not
afford the kind of hearing and review that should warrant giving preclusive
effect to the finding or determinations made; and (b) that it would frustrate the
purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Law to force adjudication of ques-
tions relating to other potential civil litigation into that forum. The Committee
also believes that deciding on an ad hoc basis whether any particular unemploy-
ment insurance determination might properly be given preclusive effect creates
an undesirable lack of certainty about the possible future ramifications of the
agency's actions. This uncertainty will inevitably cause parties to seek to re-
solve collateral matters before the unemployment insurance referees (also called
Administrative Law Judges or "AL's") or before the Unemployment Insur-
ance Board.
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In recent years, alternative means of dispute resolution have become
important resources." Therefore, the question of when the determination
of issues at administrative hearings and arbitrations should be granted
preclusive effect in subsequent judicial litigations requires critical evalua-
tion. Part I of this Article focuses on the general evolution of issue pre-
clusion in New York. Part II discusses recent New York case law giving
preclusive effect to administrative and arbitral issue determinations in
subsequent state court proceedings. Part III analyzes the policy reasons
for applying issue preclusion to administrative and arbitral issue determi-
nations in such proceedings. Part IV concludes that the preclusive effect
of these determinations in judicial forums should be limited by shifting
the burden of satisfying the full and fair opportunity requirement to the
party seeking to invoke the doctrine.
I. ISSUE PRECLUSION IN NEW YORK: EVOLUTION OF THE
CURRENT LAW
A. Origins of Issue Preclusion in New York
Originally, the common law doctrine of issue preclusion26 provided a
narrow rule prohibiting a party from relitigating any issue clearly raised
in a prior action and decided against that party.27 In New York it was
used primarily in cases involving indemnity relationships or employment
Id. at 738.
25. See Breger, The A P A: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 Va. L. Rev.
337, 355 (1986) [hereinafter The APA]; Breger, The Justice Conundrum, 28 Vill. L. Rev.
923, 952-55 (1983); Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alterna-
tive Approach, 11 Loy. L. Rev. 493, 501 (1978).
Bernard H. Goldstein, one of the deans of the New York Bar, recently remarked:
The congestion plaguing both federal and state courts has focused public atten-
tion on the efficiency of our judicial system. Awareness of the existing burden
on the judiciary, coupled with projections of increasingly frequent resort to liti-
gation, has disturbed the public, distressed the legal profession, and threatened
to diminish the quality of justice dispensed by our courts.
Goldstein, Alternatives for Resolving Business Transaction Disputes, 58 St. John's L. Rev.
69, 69 (1983) (footnotes omitted); see also Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposals for Change,
31 Vand. L. Rev. 3, 4-5 (1978) (court system is severely pressured by increase in number
of litigations); Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982) (acceptable
results in civil litigation drained of value by delay, expense and emotional stress).
26. In New York State the concept of res judicata is largely a common law doctrine.
See Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 118, 134 N.E.2d 97, 98, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3
(1956). There are no statutes which specifically require its application. As a result of the
requirement that a judgment be "on the merits" in order for the doctrine of res judicata
to be invoked, there are, however, statutes which affect the doctrine. See D. Siegel, supra
at note 2, § 442 at 586; see also N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 5013 (McKinney 1963) (defin-
ing when a dismissal is on the merits); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 3216 (a) (dismissal for
want of prosecution not on merits); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 3217 (b) (discontinuance
by means of notice operates as judgment on merits). See generally 5 J. Weinstein, H.
Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2 5013.01 (question of when dismissal is on the merits has
impact on area of res judicata).
27. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, §§ 442-443.
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and agency matters,2 8 and "was permitted in those cases only to avoid
the absurd result of having the indemnitor exonerated, while the indem-
nitee was held liable."
29
The traditional doctrine of issue preclusion applied to individual issues
of law or fact rather than to whole claims or defenses.3 0 In the past, issue
preclusion has been based more on the concern that it would be unfair to
permit a party to relitigate an issue that had been fully litigated in a prior
action and less on the notion of finality.3 1 Thus, issue preclusion could be
invoked even when the subsequent litigation involved a different cause of
action, provided that the issue concerned questions of law or fact actually
litigated and finally determined between the parties or their privies in the
first case.3 2 Unlike claim preclusion, issue preclusion did not bar the
presentation of matters that could have been determined in the first ac-
tion but were not.a3
Initially, the question of whether to grant issue preclusion was ana-
lyzed with regard to the relationship of the parties3 4 and the identity of
the issue.3 The relationship of the parties was considered in terms of (1)
privity of the parties, (2) their adversarial status, and (3) their mutuality
with the lawsuit. 36 New York courts were bound by the concept of "mu-
tuality of estoppel,"37 which prohibited a plaintiff who had not been a
party to the first action from using issue preclusion offensively against the
28. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 69, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1969).
29. Id. at 69, 246 N.E.2d at 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 958.
30. See supra notes 7, 8, 16 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
32. See Chase, supra note 7, § 21.03, at 799 ("Issues of law are less subject to preclu-
sion than those of fact."). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments states that decisions
on issues of law should not be given preclusive effect, if "(a) the two actions involve
claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order
to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to
avoid inequitable administration of the laws" Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 28(2) (1982). It has been held in New York that "unmixed" issues of law are not
subject to preclusion. See Department of Personnel v. City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 94
A.D.2d 5, 7, 462 N.Y.S.2d 878, 879 (1st Dep't 1983) (quoting McGrath v. Gold, 36
N.Y.2d 406, 411, 330 N.E.2d 35, 37, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65 (1975)).
33. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. However, the issue precluded need not
actually have been litigated. It is enough that it was implicitly decided. See Reich v.
Cochran, 151 N.Y. 122, 127-28, 45 N.E. 367, 368 (1896) (Court of Appeals held that
"'[w]hatever is necessarily implied in the former decision is, for the purpose of the estop-
pel, deemed to have been actually decided.' ")(quoting Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N.Y. 351
(1885)).
34. See King, supra note 2, at 11-12 nn.80-87.
35. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 171-72 ("It would be irrational and
unjust to bind a party by a former finding on an issue, unless that very issue had been
adjudicated.").
36. See King, supra note 2, at 11-12 nn.80-87.
37. See 5 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 2, 1 5011.38 ("Mutuality of estoppel
referred to the prior rule, now discarded, that a party was not permitted to take advan-
tage of the result in a prior action unless he could meet the same standards of participa-
tion or privity as a party who was bound by the judgment in that action.").
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
same defendant in a second action.38
The identity of issue requirement provided that "[a] former adjudica-
tion will be binding in a subsequent litigation... provided that the issue
presented (a) is identical, (b) was actually litigated, (c) essential to the
determination, and (d) was 'ultimate' or 'material' in the prior action and
is also 'ultimate' or 'material' in the [latter] suit."' 39 In cases where the
disputed facts which arose from the subsequent action were identical to
facts that had been actually litigated in an earlier action the test was
satisfied by meeting the first two requirements.4" The third and fourth
factors were considered only in more complicated cases.4'
B. The Modern Application of Issue Preclusion in New York
After eliminating the mutuality of estoppel requirement two years ear-
lier,42 the Court of Appeals introduced major revisions to the doctrine of
38. Mutuality was based on the concern that unfair results might occur if issue pre-
clusion was applied to persons not actually before the court in the first action. See D.
Siegel, supra note 2, § 460; Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties
Nor Privies - Two California Cases, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 98, 99 (1943); Note, Res Judicata
and the Automobile Accident, 8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 224, 225 (1938); see also B.R. DeWitt,
Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 148, 225 N.E.2d 195, 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 602 (1967)
(Breital, J., dissenting) (courts should be cautious when permitting offensive use of prior
judgment by one not in privity to original suit).
39. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 171; see also Restatement Judgments § 68(1) (1942)
(issue of fact had to be actually litigated for application of collateral estoppel).
40. 2 A. Freeman, Law of Judgments § 691 (5th Ed. 1925). The "actually litigated"
requirement was gradually modified. See Statter v. Statter, 2 N.Y.2d 668, 672, 143
N.E.2d 10, 12, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (1957) (first judgment of separation established valid-
ity of marriage and therefore precluded a second action for annulment). The Court of
Appeals held that issue preclusion bars the relitigation of any issue that was necessarily
determined in a prior suit. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d
725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969) (in an automobile tort case where a plaintiff
passenger established liability as against both his own driver and the other car's driver, a
subsequent suit by the passenger's driver against the other driver was deemed precluded);
Israel v. Wood Dolsen Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 120, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5
(1956) (in a commercial case a prior decision by one court that a contract had not been
breached would preclude the same plaintiff from contending, in a second action, that a
third party had induced the breach).
41. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 182-85 (when identity between issues is not com-
plete, courts consider whether such issues were ultimate or material and essential to the
determination in both matters). New York courts traditionally distinguished between
"ultimate facts" and "evidentiary facts" giving preclusive effect only to the former. See J.
Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, 5011.29. The Court of Appeals qualified
the distinction in Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 293, 165 N.E.2d 156, 159, 197
N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1959) (the court extended issue preclusion to the evidentiary findings
of a New Hampshire court, notwithstanding its conclusion that the ultimate issue was
different in New York.); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment ()
(1982) (even when a determination is necessary to judgment it may not be granted preclu-
sive effect if it relates to an evidentiary fact rather than to an issue of law).
42. Although the Court of Appeals recognized the proliferation of exceptions to the
mutuality doctrine as early as 1937, see Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery,
275 N.Y. 14, 17-18, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937) See generally 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A.
Miller, supra, note 2 5011.39, nn. 357-61 (derivative liability exception extended to
situations where party to be bound by the prior judgment was the defendant in the first
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issue preclusion in 1969.4" Both issues of law and fact may now be the
action and the plaintiff in the second), it was not until 1967 that the court eliminated
mutuality altogether. See B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195,
198, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1967). In DeWitt, the court stressed the identity of issue
requirement despite an absence of total identity of parties and concluded that the doctrine
of mutuality was a "dead letter." Id., 225 N.E.2d at 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
Speaking through Judge Scileppi, the DeWitt court stated: "[I]t becomes increasingly
obvious that this court looks to the issue involved in a prior judgment rather than to any
hypertechnical rule of mutuality...." Id. at 146, 225 N.E.2d at 197, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 600
(citing Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959)).
Thus, a truck owner, suing a jeep owner for property damage was permitted to invoke
issue preclusion against the jeep owner because of the truck driver's prior successful ver-
dict against the same jeep owner on a personal injury claim. Consequently, even though
the truck owner was not a party to the first action, the court held that he derived his right
to preclude the issue from the driver. See id. at 148, 225 N.E.2d at 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d at
601-02. The court was quick to point out that the truck driver and truck owner "do not
technically stand in... privity," but held that their relationship was sufficient to invoke
estoppel. See id. at 146, 148, 225 N.E.2d at 197, 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 600, 602.
43. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 70, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 959 (1969). In Schwartz, the Court of Appeals recognized the need for
flexibility in the application of issue preclusion, see id. at 73, 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 962 ("[n]o one would contend that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should
be applied rigidly") and stressed that the decision to grant issue preclusion should be
determined by the facts of the specific case. See id. at 70-72, 246 N.E.2d at 728-30, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 959-961. Nonetheless, the court observed that its recent decisions had
stressed the "need for a 'prompt and nonrepetitious judicial system'." Id. at 69, 246
N.E.2d at 727, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
The Schwartz court expanded the application of issue preclusion to include matters
that were necessarily decided in the prior action, but not actually litigated, see id. at 71,
246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960. It affirmed the abandonment of the mutuality
doctrine and substituted in its stead the full and fair opportunity requirement, stating:
[T]here are but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily
been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and, sec-
ond, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision
now said to be controlling.
Id. at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960. See also supra note 20 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the full and fair opportunity requirement).
Although the Schwartz court explained that the common sense and the realities of the
usual collision accident established the identity of issues common to both actions, it failed
to critically analyze this question, that had long been one of the most difficult problems in
the application of issue preclusion. See Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d at 74-75, 246 N.E.2d at 731,
298 N.Y.S.2d at 963. The court in effect implied that the "identity of issue" prerequisite
should be of less importance than the "full and fair opportunity" requirement. See id. at
72-73, 246 N.E.2d at 729-30, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961-62; supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
Finally, the court diminished the privity concept stating that it had, "'already dis-
carded, as irrelevant.., the fact that there may or may not have been any significant jural
relationship between the party seeking to invoke the doctrine and the prior victor." Id. at
70, 246 N.E.2d at 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 958-59 (citations omitted).
Today, "strict privity" (decedent-representative, trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward,
committee-incompetent) is still used in connection with issue preclusion. See Ryan v.
New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826
(1984). Except for the use of "strict privity," the privity concept has little practical rele-
vance or utility. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, § 461. Professor Siegel points out that New
York has abandoned the privity requirement when issue preclusion is used defensively in
the second action, but that the doctrine "still hovers about, threatening if not belligerent,
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bases for preclusion." The doctrine was made applicable to cases involv-
ing tort claims, 45 product liability matters,4 6 criminal convictions,47 med-
ical malpractice, a8 contract disputes,"9 and bankruptcy determinations,"
as well as administrative decisions, 5 and arbitration awards.5 2
As the doctrine now stands, a valid53 final judgment54 on the merits s
when offensive use is sought." Id. at 609. The diminishing of the privity doctrine has
resulted in issue preclusion being utilized by persons who were not a party to the original
action. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 453, 482 N.E.2d 63, 65, 492
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (1985) (third party permitted use of issue preclusion); Strauss v. Belle
Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 401, 482 N.E.2d 34, 35, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985) (same);
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Amer., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 192, 480 N.E.2d 679, 681, 491 N.Y.S.2d
90, 92 (1985) (same). But see Liss v. Trans Auto Sys., 68 N.Y.2d 15, 22-23, 496 N.E.2d
851, 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (1986) (Court of Appeals refuses to give preclusive effect
to determination of administrative proceeding when defendant in second action was not
party to previous action).
44. "Issues of law are less subject to preclusion than those of fact." 0. Chase, supra
note 7, § 21.03, 799. "Unmixed" issues of law are not subject to preclusion. See Mc-
Grath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406, 411, 330 N.E.2d 35, 38, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65 (1975); see
also Restatement (Second) Judgments § 28, comment B (1982) ("the journey from a pure
question of fact to a pure question of law is one of subtle gradations rather than one
marked by a rigid divide").
45. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 552-53, 468 N.E.2d 1, 3-4,
479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165-66 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985); Malloy v.
Trombey, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 51, 405 N.E.2d 213, 215, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972 (1980).
46. See Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 453, 482 N.E.2d 63, 65, 492
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (1985).
47. See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 98 A.D.2d 495, 496-97, 472 N.Y.S.2d 97,
98 (2d Dep't 1984). See also 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, at
5011.23, nn.203-05; % 5011.26, n.241 (operation of issue preclusion in criminal cases dif-
fers in some respects from civil matters). But see Davis v. Hanna, 97 A.D.2d 943, 944,
468 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (4th Dep't 1983) (conviction after a guilty plea does not serve as a
bar in subsequent civil litigation.)
48. See Kret v. Brookdale Hosp. Medical Center, 93 A.D.2d 449, 449-50, 462
N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (2d Dep't 1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 861, 462 N.E.2d 147, 473 N.Y.S.2d
970 (1984).
49. See Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 483, 386 N.E.2d
1328, 1330, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (1979) (assuming privity requirements are met doc-
trine of issue preclusion is applicable to contract claims).
50. See Exchange Nat. Bank v. Ferridge Properties, 112A.D.2d 33, 34, 490 N.Y.S.2d
656, 657 (4th Dep't 1985).
51. Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 195, 489
N.Y.S.2d 54, 54, (1985); Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 467 N.E.2d
487, 489-90, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825-26 (1984). See generally infra notes 80 - 106 and
accompanying text (discussing the granting of preclusive effect to administrative determi-
nations in judicial forums).
52. Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 747-48, 481 N.E.2d 560, 560-61, 492 N.Y.S.2d
20, 20-21 (1985). See generally infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text (discussing the
granting of preclusive effect to determinations in judicial forums).
53. See 0. Chase, supra note 17, § 25.04[b] ("A judgment which is not valid can have
no binding effect and its validity can be collaterally attacked.")
54. See id. § 25.04[a] ("The result in the first action will not generally have a binding
effect on a subsequent action unless a final judgment has been reached in the first.").
However, "[t]he pendency of an appeal does not effect the judgment's use for [issue pre-
clusion purposes]." 5 J. Weinstein, H. Kor & A. Miller, supra note 2, at 5011.23b,
n.220.
55. See 0. Chase, supra note 17 § 25.04[c] ("The traditional rule is that a judgment
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prevents parties or their privies56 from relitigating issues of fact or law
actually litigated or necessarily determined, in an earlier action. 57 In or-
der to invoke issue preclusion the movant must establish the "identity of
an issue" that was necessarily decided in the earlier proceeding with one
that is decisive in the second action. 8 The doctrine will be applied, how-
ever, only if the opposing party fails to show that he was denied a full
and fair opportunity to contest the issue in the first proceeding. 9 Thus,
application of the doctrine hinges on showing the identity of the issues
and satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity test.
1. Identity of Issue
In applying the identity of issue test, a court will review the record in
the first action to determine if an issue actually litigated and necessary to
a final judgment on the merits is the same as an issue decisive to the
second action." Thus, if the legal theory in both actions is the same and
there are no significant differences in the facts upon which both theories
are based, identity of issue is generally satisfied.6' This is true even when
must be on the merits before full res judicata effect can be given to it."). But see Smith v.
Russell Sage College, 54 N.Y.2d 185, 194 n.3, 429 N.E.2d 746, 750 n.3 445 N.Y.S.2d 68,
72 n.3 (1981) ("It is pertinent that the Restatement [of Judgments], 2d has completely
abandoned the term 'on the merits.' "). See generally N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 5013
(McKinney 1963) (defining a "dismissal on the merits").
56. The general rule is that only persons who were parties to the original action can
be bound by its result in a later proceeding. See Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v.
Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 486, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1979); 5 J.
Weinstein, H. Kom & A. Miller, supra note 2, at 5011.32-to.37. The rule is subject to
exceptions when persons are in privity with a party to the original action. See 0. Chase,
supra note 17, § 25.04[f]. Similarly, "[a] person who controls the conduct of litigation in
furtherance of his own self-interest will be bound,... even though he is not a party of
record or otherwise in privity with a party." Id.
57. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984).
58. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 554, 468 N.E.2d 1, 4, 479
N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985); Ryan v. New York Tel.
Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500-01, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984). Cf.
Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 457-58, 482 N.E.2d 63, 68-69, 492 N.Y.S.2d
584, 589-90 (1985) (if issue is not litigated there is no identity of issue).
59. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490-91,478
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826-27 (1984) (party against whom estoppel is sought must be allowed to
contend he was not afforded full and fair opportunity to litigate issue); Schwartz v. Public
Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 959 (1969) ("New
York has adopted the full and fair opportunity test in applying the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.").
60. See Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 455-56, 482 N.E.2d 63, 68, 492
N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725,
728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969). See also 0. Chase, supra note 17, r 25.031b] 25-9
(legal conclusion in two cases based on same facts should not differ).
61. See 0. Chase, supra note 17, 25.03[b], at 25-8-to-9. But see Peresluha v. City of
New York, 60 A.D.2d 226, 230, 400 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819-20 (1st Dep't 1977) (finding of
negligence in prior litigation did not estop plaintiff from bringing subsequent malicious
prosecution action arising from same facts); Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 211, 218,
377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 125 (2d Dep't 1975) (in products liability action where plaintiffs
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many parties assert the same claims in different actions arising from one
transaction or occurrence against the same defendant.62
Generally, the identity of issue requirement is not satisfied if the issue
determination in the first action was merely an alternative ground for
deciding the case.6 3 In at least one instance, however, the Court of Ap-
peals has held that if an alternative issue determination was fully argued
and carefully considered, it cannot be relitigated.64
2. Full and Fair Opportunity Test
Satisfaction of the "full and fair opportunity test" requires the exami-
nation of a number of factors first set forth by the Court of Appeals in
Schwartz v. Public Administrator.65 These factors, which the Schwartz
court described as modern and stable standards for invoking issue preclu-
sion in New York, include "the size of the claim, the forum of the prior
litigation, ... the extent of the litigation, the competence and experience
of counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise
verdict, differences in the applicable law and foreseeability of future
litigation."66
sought to preclude the issue of whether the drug was defective, Appellate Division re-
fused to apply the doctrine since the ultimate issue as to causal relationship between the
defect and the injuries was not identical in the two actions).
62. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 557, 468 N.E.2d 1, 5-6, 479
N.Y.S.2d 163, 167-68 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985).
63. See O'Conner v. G & R Packing Co., 53 N.Y.2d 278, 282-83, 423 N.E.2d 397,
398-99, 440 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921-22 (1981) (alternative ground for deciding first action may
be relitigated because the judge did not consider the effect of his holding on the second
action); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment (i) (1982) (alternative
grounds should not be granted preclusive effect); 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller,
supra note 2, at % 5011.28 ("There exists concern that, a determination in the alternative
may not have been as carefully or rigorously considered as it would have if it had been
necessary to the result, and in that sense it has some of the characteristics of dicta.' ")
(quoting Restatment (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment (i) (1982)).
64. Malloy v. Trombly, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 49-50, 405 N.E.2d 213, 215, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969,
971 (1980) (divided Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff motorist's action against a
defendant motorist was precluded because the plaintiff had been found to have been con-
tributorily negligent in a prior action involving the same facts). Although the earlier
issue determination was neither necessary nor essential to the Court of Claims' decision,
the Court of Appeals held that, since the determination was neither "causal [nor] of any
lesser quality than [it would have been] had the outcome of the trial depended solely on
this issue," the same issue could not be relitigated. Id. at 52, 405 N.E.2d at 216, 427
N.Y.S.2d at 973 (footnote omitted).
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Meyer criticized the majority for invoking issue preclusion
merely to conserve judicial resources. Judge Meyer noted that, "[i]n my view our recent
decisions have accelerated [the] expansion [of issue preclusion] until the means threatens
to become the end, to the detriment of litigants foreclosed by it, and without reasonable
relation to the policy factors giving rise to the doctrine in the first instance." Id. at 58,
405 N.E.2d at 220, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
65. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 961 (1969). See supra
notes 20, 43 and accompanying text.
66. Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d
955, 961 (1969). See supra notes 20, 43 and accompanying text. Applying the test, the
court remarked that the plaintiffs in the second action were full participants in the earlier
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The full and fair opportunity requirement extends beyond terms of
traditional notions of due process.67 Satisfaction of this test requires a
comparison of the procedural opportunities available in both forums.6"
The Court of Appeals has suggested that issue preclusion cannot be in-
voked if a forum in the second action affords a party, against whom pre-
clusion is invoked, new procedural opportunities that could result in
inconsistent determinations.69
II. THE APPLICATION OF ISSUE PRECLUSION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
AND ARBITRAL DETERMINATIONS IN SUBSEQUENT CIVIL
LITIGATION IN JUDICIAL FORUMS
A. Historical Background
Traditionally, when a non-judicial tribunal acts in a quasi-judicial
manner, its determinations are entitled to the same effect as a duly ren-
dered judicial determination."0 In 1952, the Court of Appeals granted
preclusive effect to a determination by a Workmen's Compensation
Board when the same issue was raised in a subsequent negligence ac-
tion.71 The court held that since the employer had successfully contested
the claim before the Workmen's Compensation Board, the employer
could not interpose a contrary defense in a tort action pending in a judi-
cial forum. 7 2 Nonetheless, the court did not preclude the employer de-
cases. Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d at 72, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. In addition
to a vigorous fight on the issue of liability, each of the plaintiffs "had a full opportunity to
tell his story at the first trial .. " Id., 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. None
claimed a "lack of adequate representation." Id., 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
Nor was any one able to show "prejudice because of the forum of the earlier action." Id.,
246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961, nor that his adversary had "any tactical advan-
tages." Id., 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. The court held that, "[i]t is, there-
fore, utterly fair to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel here and to the typical case
where driver sues driver following a verdict by a passenger against both." Id. at 72-73,
246 N.E.2d at 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
67. See People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 417 N.E.2d 518, 522, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224,
228 (1980). Although Plevy had been given due process in the sense that he had had a
full opportunity to testify, the Court of Appeals noted that: "other circumstances which,
although not legal impediments, may have had the practical effect of discouraging or
deterring a party from fully litigating the determination which is now asserted against
him." Id. 417 N.E.2d at 522, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (citing Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24
N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969)).
68. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 555 n.4, 468 N.E.2d 1, 4
n.4, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 n.4 (1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29
(1982)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985).
69. Id. at 556, 468 N.E.2d 1, 5, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 167 (judicial determinations may
be inconsistent with "those in cases tried in the Small Claims Part of the Civil Court of
New York City as to which informal and simplified procedures are applicable .... ): see
also infra note 172 and accompanying text.
70. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, at § 456 (citing Evans v. Monaghan. 306 N.Y. 312.
118 N.E.2d 452 (1954)). See also 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller. supra note 2. at
5011.23, n.210.
71. See Ogino v. Black. 304 N.Y. 872, 873, 109 N.E.2d 884. 884 (1952).
72. See id.. 109 N.E.2d at 884 (because Workmen's Compensation Board determined
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fendant from contesting the issue of his alleged liability.?3
Two years later, the Court of Appeals articulated its reasons for giving
administrative agency decisions preclusive effect in subsequent judicial
proceedings.7 4 Although the court pointed out that the rule of res judi-
cata should be applicable in administrative determinations, it refused to
apply the doctrine in light of newly discovered evidence. 75 In subsequent
cases, the Court of Appeals continued to suggest that general principles
of res judicata were applicable to adminstrative decisions. 6 The Court of
Appeals has noted, however, that the decision whether to grant such de-
terminations preclusive effect proved remarkably elusive.77
B. Granting Preclusive Effect to Adminstrative Determinations
In Ryan v. New York Telephone Co.,78 the Court of Appeals held that
the determinations of an administrative agency have preclusive effect in
subsequent judicial proceedings.79 Ryan was discharged by the New
York Telephone Company after being arrested for theft of company
property. The arrest was based on the testimony of two security investi-
gators who claimed that Ryan had removed company property from the
accidental injuries did not arise out of plaintiff-employee's course of employment, defend-
ant-employer could not claim that Workmen's Compensation Law was plaintiff's exclu-
sive remedy).
73. See id., 109 N.E.2d at 884.
74. See Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 323-26, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-59 (1954).
The court stated that:
Security of person and property requires that determinations in the field of ad-
ministrative law should be given as much finality as is reasonably possible. The
... rule of resjudicata is applicable ... wherever consistent with the purposes of
the tribunal, board or officer .... Indeed, it is the instinct of our jurisprudence
to extend court principles to administrative or quasi-judicial hearings insofar as
they may be adapted to such procedures.
Id. at 323-24, 118 N.E.2d at 457-58 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 324, 118 N.E.2d at 458 ("The unsealing of Harry Gross' lips after he had
refused to testify at the first departmental trial, is tantamount to newly discovered evi-
dence."); see also N.Y. Times, The Lonely Death of a Man Who Made a Scandal, April 5,
1986 at Ll, col. 1 (traces rise and fall of Harry Gross and the scandal which prompted
the departure of Police Commissioner William P. O'Brien and other city officials and the
resignation of Mayor William O'Dwyer).
76. See Capital Tel. Co. v. Pattersonville Tel. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 11, 15-16, 436 N.E.2d
461, 462-63, 451 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12-13 (1982); Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d
520, 524, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978).
77. See Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 523, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989,
402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808-09 (1978).
78. 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984).
79. Id. at 505, 467 N.E.2d at 493, N.Y.S.2d at 829. The Court of Appeals decision to
give preclusive effect in a judicial forum to an administrative determination followed the
lead of several earlier decisions by federal courts in New York and the New York State
appellate divisions. See, e.g., Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 268-69
(2d Cir. 1977); DeSimone v. South African Marine Corp., 82 A.D.2d 820, 821, 439
N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (2d Dep't 1981); Newsday, Inc. v. Ross, 80 A.D.2d 1, 5, 437 N.Y.S.2d
376, 379 (2d Dep't 1981); Bernstein v. Birch Wathen School, 71 A.D.2d 129, 132, 421
N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (1st Dep't 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 932, 415 N.E.2d 982, 434 N.Y.S.2d
994 (1980); Blanco v. Blum, 67 A.D.2d 947, 948, 413 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (2d Dep't 1979).
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workplace. After his discharge, Ryan applied for unemployment insur-
ance benefits, but his application was rejected by a claims examiner on
the ground that the discharge was the result of Ryan's own misconduct.
Ryan filed an administrative appeal and was granted a hearing before
an Unemployment Insurance Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). 0 Af-
ter considering the testimony of Ryan and the hearsay testimony of one
witness, the ALT sustained the ruling of the claims examiner and found
that the "'claimant was seen ... removing company property from the
company premises.' The ALJ then affirmed the denial of Ryan's un-
employment benefits. This ruling was affirmed by the Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Board, and upheld by the Appellate Division. 82 Prior
to the Appellate Division's affirmation of the administrative determina-
tion, Ryan filed a tort action for false arrest, malicious prosecution, slan-
der and wrongful discharge. The defendant raised an affirmative defense
that because this action turned on the question of Ryan's misconduct, res
judicata barred relitigation of the issue. The affirmative defense was dis-
missed by the Special Term and the Appellate Division affirmed.83 The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that issue preclusion applied.'
The Ryan decision illustrates the increasing level of respect given by
the Court of Appeals to administrative determinations.85 The Court of
Appeals, using the terms issue preclusion and claim preclusion inter-
changeably, first stressed that res judicata was founded upon the belief
that it is in the public's interest to finalize litigation.86 It then stated that
the controlling factor for issue preclusion is "the identity of the issue
which has necessarily been decided in the prior action."87 The court
found that the identity of issue test had been met. It recognized that the
agency's determinations that Ryan was guilty of stealing company prop-
erty and was terminated for cause, were essential factors in deciding the
validity of his tort claims.8 8 As these issues were material to the adminis-
trative determination and decisive to the claim raised by Ryan in his law-
suit, the doctrine of issue preclusion could be invoked to prevent their
relitigation.89
The court pointed out that Ryan had testified on his own behalf and,
through his union representative, had cross-examined the defendant's
80. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 497-98, 467 N.E.2d 487, 489,478
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1984).
81. See id. at 498, 467 N.E.2d at 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825 (quoting findings of the
ALJ) (ellipsis in original).
82. See id., 467 N.E.2d at 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
83. See id. at 498-99, 467 N.E.2d at 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
84. See id. at 505, 467 N.E.2d at 493, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
85. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, § 456, at 95 (Supp. 1985).
86. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 467 N.F-2d 487, 490, 478
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984).
87. Id., 467 N.E.2d at 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
88. See id. at 502, 467 N.E.2d at 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 827-28.
89. Id. at 500-03, 467 N.E.2d at 490-92, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 826-28.
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witnesses at the hearing.9" In addition, the court noted that Ryan had
voluntarily initiated the hearing, knowingly chose to appear before it
without legal counsel and that the hearing was held before an ALJ.
Moreover, the record demonstrated to the court that the administrative
procedure was fair and that Ryan had a full opportunity to litigate the
issue of misconduct. 9' Thus, the court held that the prior litigation had
been sufficiently extensive and adversarial to constitute a full and fair
hearing.
92
In contrast to the court's findings, the circumstances surrounding the
prior litigation suggest that Ryan was inadequately represented before
the ALJ and, therefore, had been denied a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue at the previous hearing. Ryan's union representative
was not an attorney; and it is unlikely that Ryan, who was on welfare,93
could have afforded legal counsel.94 Additionally, Ryan's representative
was frequently interrupted by the ALJ and continually urged to complete
his case.95 The Court of Appeals did not explain how the full and fair
opportunity requirement could be satisfied in a proceeding conducted
without the benefit of pre-trial disclosure or formal rules of evidence.
Nor did the court discuss the differences between appellate review of evi-
dentiary rulings in administrative and judicial forums.9 6
There are substantial procedural differences between judicial and ad-
ministrative forums.97 These differences were underscored by the ALJ's
insistence that the hearing was not a trial.98 Furthermore, the ALJ lim-
90. Id. at 503, 467 N.E.2d at 492, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
91. Id. at 503-04, 467 N.E.2d at 492, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
92. Id., 467 N.E.2d at 492, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
93. Record on Appeal at 21, Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d
487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984); see Plaintiff-Respondents Brief at 5, Ryan v. New York
Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984).
94. The court has indicated that it will not apply issue preclusion against a defendant
who testified at, but was not a party to, an administrative hearing. Preclusion was not
granted because such a person lacks control over his testimony, the opportunity for cross-
examination and the guidance of counsel, see Liss v. Trans Auto Supply Co., 68 N.Y.2d
15, 22, 496 N.E.2d 851, 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (1986), the Ryan decision suggests
that such counsel need not be an attorney. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d
494, 503-04, 467 N.E.2d 487, 492, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 828 (1984).
95. Record on Appeal at 60-61, 69-70, 72-73, 78, 81-82, 88, 101, Ryan v. New York
Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984).
96. See 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice, at 7803.02
and nn.6-9, 7803.04. See generally 0. Chase, supra note 17, at §§ 26.04-.06 (discussing
questions available for review by appellate courts once the appeal is properly filed); id. at
§ 32.04 (issues available for review in an Article 78 proceeding). Since judicial review is
limited to the administrative record, matters such as objections relating to hearsay evi-
dence and failure to comply with the rules of evidence cannot be considered.
97. See N.Y. Comp. R. & Reg. tit. 12(c) § 461.4 (1982) ("[tlhe administrative law
judge shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or
formal rules of procedure."); cf. D. Siegel, supra note 2, at § 597 ("the usual evidentiary
rules applicable in court are waived in arbitration").
98. See Record on Appeal at 67, Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467
N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984) ("this isn't a criminal trial").
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ited cross-examination of the only witness testifying against Ryan."
Much of this witness' testimony was based on hearsay,"m and the ALJ
refused to allow an adjournment that would have permitted a witness
having direct knowledge of Ryan's alleged misconduct to testify.' The
hearing's transcript implies that no one contemplated that an issue deter-
mination by an ALJ would be dispositive of Ryan's tort claim in a judi-
cial forum.'0 2
In Brugman v City of New York," °3 the Court of Appeals gave preclu-
sive effect to an administrative determination that rested soley on written
documents and was conducted without a hearing of any type."' Both
the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division affirmed the New York
City Employee's Retirement System (NYCERS) administrative decision
denying Brugman's application for accidental disability status. "s In a
subsequent tort action to recover damages resulting from the incident
considered before the NYCERS, the defendants moved to amend their
answer to assert issue preclusion as an affirmative defense. The motion
was granted and Brugman's tort action was dismissed. ' 06 Special Term's
decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division with a dissenting opin-
99. See id at 67 ("I understand all the lighting and the distance have to do with the
quality of the testimony, but I ask you to keep all your questions relevant."); id. at 103
("I don't feel-whether or not he feels the witness is lying is necessary to todays [sic]
hearing").
100. Record on Appeal at 74-76, Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467
N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984); see also id. at 195 (use of hearsay testimony at
administrative hearing attacked in claimant's brief to appellate division).
101. Id. at 101.
102. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
103. 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985).
104. During the pendency of Brugman's action to recover damages for injuries alleg-
edly sustained on August 30, 1979, Brugman v. City of New York, 102 A.D.2d 413, 413,
477 N.Y.S.2d 636, 636 (1st Dep't 1984), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d l011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489
N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985), which Brugman claimed occurred while he was working as a sanita-
tion worker, Record on Appeal at 24-25, 49, 86, 90, Brugman v. City of New York, 64
N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985), the Board of Trustees of the New
York City Employee's Retirement System ("NYCERS") denied Brugman's application
for accidental disability status on the grounds that Brugman's accident reports and hospi-
tal records indicated that the injury was the result of lifting heavy garbage containers.
Record on Appeal at 53, 56, 66, 67, Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478
N.E.2d 195,489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985) (No. 80-6935). Brugman then resubmitted his appli-
cation, supported by photographs of the accident site and the sworn statement of a wit-
ness to the accident, see id. at 73-77, but the Board affirmed its previous decision, see id.
at 98-99, primarily basing its affirmation on two letters from doctors who examined the
patient. See id. at 56-57, 111. One of these letters relied on by the Board stated, "-[]n my
opinion, the conclusion reached by Dr. Cheung with regard to the relationship of this
patient's condition to the incident when he developed pain on his back while lifting a can
is a totally unwarranted conclusion." Id. at I ll (emphasis added). This apparently contra-
dicts the Board's conclusion.
105. See Brugman v. Board of Trustees, 91 A.D.2d 872, 458 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1st Dep't
1982).
106. Brugman v. City of New York, 102 A.D.2d 413, 419, 477 N.Y.S.2d 636, 640 (Ist
Dep't 1984), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985).
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ion."°7 The dissent argued that the procedures followed by the NYCERS
Board did not satisfy the full and fair opportunity requirement because
they were not "substantially similar to those used in a court of law."'"8
The majority concluded, however, that issue preclusion was proper be-
cause the issues presented in both forums were identical and Brugman
had failed to show that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate the issues before the NYCERS Board.' 09 The majority also stressed
that the administrative determination by the NYCERS was affirmed in
three administrative proceedings, and reviewed in a special judicial
proceeding."o
The Court of Appeals, in a memorandum opinion, unanimously
adopted the majority's position.I" Implicit in the Brugman decision is
the court's determination that the full and fair opportunity requirement
can be satisfied on the basis of a paper record, without the application of
formal rules of evidence." 2
In Liss v. Trans Auto Systems, 3 the Court of Appeals clarified the
extent to which administrative determinations are given preclusive effect.
The court held that issue preclusion could not be applied against a de-
fendant who was neither a party1 14 nor a party in interest' 5 to the ad-
ministrative hearing. It recognized that the full and fair opportunity
requirement cannot be satisfied without the occasion to present evidence
107. Id. at 419, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
108. Id. at 420, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 641 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (quoting Ryan v. New
York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984)).
The dissent argued that, "[t]he administrative forum must have the 'essential procedural
characteristics of a court.' The procedure of the Retirement System does not meet these
requirements.., there is no court-like hearing-no examination and cross-examintion of
witnesses, no presiding officer performing the functions of a judge, no 'adversary proceed-
ing.' " Id. at 420-21, 477 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 415, 417-18, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
110. Id. at 415, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
111. Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 1012, 478 N.E.2d 195, 196, 489
N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (1985). The Court of Appeals pointed out that the plaintiff had "no
occasion for cross-examination." Id. at 1012, 478 N.E.2d at 196, 489 N.YS.2d at 55.
Thus, the court implicitly adopted the Appellate Division's contention that the full and
fair opportunity requirement could be applied to administrative determinations absent "a
court-like hearing [and the] examination or cross-examination of witnesses." See
Brugman v. City of New York, 102 A.D.2d 413, 417, 477 N.Y.S.2d 636, 639 (lst Dep't
1984), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985).
112. See Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 1012, 478 N.E.2d 195, 196,
489 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (1985); supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. The Brugman
court reasoned that since plaintiff was the only witness before the Board, cross examina-
tion was unnecessary. Additionally, plaintiff admitted on argument that "he had no
other evidence to present and was unaware of any evidence that might be discoverable."
Brugman, 64 N.Y.2d at 1012, 478 N.E.2d at 196, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 55. Thus, the court
held that, in this case, the full and fair opportunity requirement was satisfied absent these
procedures. See id., 478 N.E.2d at 196, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
113. 68 N.Y.2d 15, 496 N.E.2d 851, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1986).
114. See id. at 18, 496 N.E.2d at 853, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
115. See id. at 22, 496 N.E.2d at 855, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
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and to cross-examine witnesses.' 16 Additionally even if the party against
whom preclusion is sought testified at the hearing, he must have had
both the opportunity to control the development of his testimony and the
guidance of counsel." 7
C. Granting Preclusive Effect to Arbitral Determinations
In Clemens v. Apple,"' the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division's decision granting preclusive effect to an issue determined at an
arbitration before a Health Services Administrative (HSA) Panel, 9 not-
ing that the decision was fully consistent with Ryan v. New York Tele-
phone Co."20 The court emphasized that the full and fair opportunity
requirement had been satisfied, stressing that Clemens, who was repre-
sented by counsel, freely chose arbitration after the commencement of his
personal injury action. It concluded that Clemens, therefore, could have
foreseen the possibility that an adverse arbitral award would preclude
relitigation of the causal factors relating to his suit.' 2'
In Clemens, the HSA Arbitration Panel based its decision on an infor-
mal fifteen minute hearing before a two-doctor Panel that did not call
any witnesses.' 2 In addition, the substantive and procedural law of New
York were not binding on the HSA Panel and the judicial review avail-
able was far less stringent than for administrative determinations. "
The Clemens decision suggests a shift in emphasis by the Court of Ap-
peals from achieving a just result for litigants to conserving of judicial
resources. 124 This shift has serious policy implications. For example,
making the results of an issue determination at a voluntary arbitration
116. See id., 496 N.E.2d at 855, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
117. See id., 496 N.E.2d at 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 836. But see supra note 94 and ac-
companying text (guidance need not be provided by attorney).
118. 65 N.Y.2d 746, 481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985).
119. Clemens v. Apple, 102 A.D.2d 236, 477 N.Y.S.2d 774 (3d Dep't 1984), aff'd, 65
N.Y.2d 746, 481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985). The Appellate Division held "it is
apparent from the record that Clemens was accorded a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate his claim . I..." d. at 237, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
120. See Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 748, 481 N.E.2d 560, 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d
20, 20 (1985).
121. See id. at 749, 481 N.E.2d at 561, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
122. Record on Appeal at 68-69, Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 481 N.E.2d 560,
492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985) (plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion for par-
tial summary judgment). The report on which the arbitrators relied was based on one
brief examination of Clemens on January 19, 1978, where a doctor stated that: "[t]he
patient's diagnosis at this time is a cervical sprain secondary to his automobile accident
.... "' Id. at 49. The other report, which was not utilized by the panel, related the
herniated disc injury to the automobile accident, was based on a continual series of treat-
ments from May 18, 1979 through February 18, 1980. Id. at 74-83.
123. Compare N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7511 (McKinney 1981) (governing review of
arbitral decisions) with N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1981) (governing
review of administrative determinations). See D. Siegal, Expanding Applications of Col-
lateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion), 310 N.Y. St. L. Dig. 1 (1985).
124. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 357, 359
(1974) (judicial economy furthered through granting of issue preclusion).
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binding at a subsequent litigation may discourage the use of arbitration,
and encourage the use of the courts, defeating the court's attempt to re-
duce congestion. 2 5 Well-advised plaintiffs may forego a simplified deter-
mination of disputes with their carriers, while uninformed plaintiffs may
be bound by decisions of arbitrators, made without the procedural safe-
guards present in judicial forums. 26 Finally, this shift might impose un-
anticipated hardships on accident victims. 27
III. POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF ISSUE PRECLUSION
TO ADMINISTRATIVE AND ARBITRAL DETERMINATIONS
The policies supporting the doctrine of issue preclusion 21 include soci-
ety's desire to: (1) promote fairness; 29 (2) prevent inconsistent judgments
and to achieve uniformity and certainty;3 (3) finalize disputes among
the parties;' 3 ' and (4) conserve judicial resources. 32 This section will
analyze the Court of Appeals' expansion of the doctrine's scope 133 in
terms of the interaction of these considerations to guide the courts in
granting preclusive effect administrative and arbitral issue determina-
tions in subsequent judicial litigations.
A. Consideration of Fairness
Concepts of fair play and due process have consistently been important
125. Cf. University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3228 (1986) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (litigants may forego state administrative determina-
tions as a result of their fear of future preclusive effect).
126. Cf. id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. See infra Parts III-IV.
128. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
129. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500-01, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490-9 1,
478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826-27 (1984) (issue preclusion only applies when issue has been fairly
litigated); Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d
49, 50 (1981) (same); People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521, 436
N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (1980) (same); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 69, 246
N.E.2d 725, 727-28, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1969) (same).
130. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984) (issue preclusion applies when different result in second pro-
ceeding would destroy rights created in first).
131. See id. at 500, 467 N.E.2d at 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 826 (1984) ("[O]nce... tried,
all litigation of that question, and between those parties, should be closed forever." (quot-
ing Fish v. Vanderlip, 218 N.Y. 29, 36-37, 112 N.E. 425, 428 (1916) (quoting Greenleaf's
Evidence §§ 522, 523)); People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521, 436
N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (1980) (doctrine provides means for swift resolution of disputes);
Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 523-24, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 402
N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978) (decisions need to be granted as much finality as possible) (cit-
ing Matter of Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 323-24, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-58
(1954)).
132. See Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d
49, 50 (1981) (doctrine conserves resources of courts and litigant). See supra notes 2-4
and accompanying text.
133. See D. Siegel, supra note 2, § 456 95, (Supp. 1985).
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policy considerations for courts when considering issue preclusion.'
These considerations are manifest in the Court of Appeals' "full and fair
opportunity" test which requires the court to consider such factors as,
the forum of the prior litigation, the foreseeability of the subsequent ac-
tion the size of the plaintiff's claim and the ability of the party's
counsel.1
3 5
Satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity test requires more than
traditional notions of due process and fair play.'36 In Parklane Hosiery v.
Shore,137 the Supreme Court admonished that issue preclusion should
seldom be applied if a second forum affords a party procedural opportu-
nities, such as full discovery and the benefit of evidentiary rules, that
were unavailable in the first forum and could cause a different result.'
The Ryan court, balancing the consideration of fairness and the need for
finality, cited Parklane to support its invocation of issue preclusion.' 3 9
The Court of Appeals did not, however, establish standards for determin-
ing what administrative or arbitral procedures, if any, are necessary for
satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity requirement.' ° Implicit in
134. See supra notes 11, 129 and accompanying text; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (fairness dictates when offensive use of doctrine permit-
ted); Capital Tel. Co. v. Pattersonville Tel. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 11, 21, 436 N.E.2d 461, 465,
451 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15 (1982) (plaintiffs did not have a full and fair opportunity to contest
the issue because no evidentiary hearing was held); Venes v. Community School Bd., 43
N.Y.2d 520, 524-25, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978) (determination
of a school board not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity should not be given res judicata
effect).
135. See supra notes 20, 65-69 and accompanying text.
136. People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 417 N.E.2d 518, 522, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 228
(1980) ("when the application of collateral estoppel is at issue, any question as to whether
a party had 'a full and fair opportunity' to litigate the prior determination is not con-
cluded by a finding that there was no violation of due process").
137. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
138. Id. 330-31. In Parklane, the Supreme Court permitted offensive use of non-
mutual issue preclusion by plaintiff stockholders who, although they were not parties or
privies to an earlier adjudication by the SEC, sought to preclude the defendants from
relitigating the issue of an alleged violation of federal securities laws. Parklane has gener-
ated extensive commentary of its own. See, e.g., Collen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality,
Not to Praise It: an Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parkiane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31
Hastings L.J. 755 (1980); Flanagan, Offensive Collateral Estoppel Inefficiency and Foolish
Consistency, 1982 Ariz. St. L.J. 45; Kempkes, Issue Preclusion: Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore Revisited, 31 Drake L. Rev. 111 (1981). Prior to Parklane the Supreme Court had
granted preclusive effect to administrative findings. See United States v. Utah Constr. &
Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 400-01, 418-19 (1966) (an administrative contract appeals
agency made factual findings which were later held as conclusive, on principles of issue
preclusion, in a civil action). As commentators have noted, after Utah federal courts have
often held that precluding relitigation of administrative issue determinations is a useful
tool for reducing caseloads. See, eg., Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Lim-
iting the Preclusive Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 422, 432-444; Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Administrative Agency
Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 65, 70-71 (1977).
139. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 467 N.E.2d 487, 489, 478
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1984).
140. Cf. McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-92 (1984) (United States
Supreme Court analyzed arbitral procedures and concluded that they were not sufficient
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the Court of Appeals' granting preclusive effect to the administrative de-
terminations in Ryan 14 and Brugman 112 and the arbitral determinations
in Clemens,'43 is the notion that the requirement can be satisfied without
pre-trial discovery or formal application of the rules of evidence. This
raises the question of whether litigants should be deprived of rights tradi-
tionally guaranteed them by our adversarial system. 144
There are several advantages to extensive discovery: it assures fairness
to the litigants and prevents surprises it encourages settlements and it
usually improves both the efficiency of a trial or hearing and the quality
of the decision made therein.'45 In New York, administrative agencies
are not required to permit discovery.' 46 Agency decisions to prohibit or
limit a party's discovery rights do not violate due process. 47 Thus, a
litigant is not guaranteed access to relevant and nonprivileged informa-
tion which is in the exclusive possession of his adversary. This may pre-
vent him from developing or formulating issues as he would in a court of
to apply issue preclusion in federal court to unappealed arbitration awards in actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483-
85 (1982) (in confirming issue preclusion bar of Title VII claim, the Court analyzed pano-
ply of administrative procedures followed by New York State and concluded they were
sufficient under due process clause.). But see University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 106 S. Ct.
3220, 3227 (1986) ("[W]e hold that when a state agency 'acting in a judicial capacity...
resolves disputed issue of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate
opportunity to litigate' ... federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same
preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in state courts.") (citations omitted).
Commentators have suggested that the full and fair opportunity requirement, which
the Court of Appeals has extended beyond terms of traditional notions of due process,
contemplates full disclosure and trial-like procedures. See supra note 24 and accompany-
ing text. Thus, although neither the N.Y. State Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.)
nor case law requires that administrative procedure conform with traditional judicial
models, satisfaction of the full and fair opportunity requirement places a higher burden of
procedural fairness upon administrative and arbitral tribunals. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (judicial mode of an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to
the termination of disability benefits); Schwartz, Administrative Law, 36 Syracuse L. Rev.
1, 5-6 (1985) (although "not governed by rules of evidence.... basic principles of fairness
do apply"). To meet this burden, the party invoking issue preclusion should be required
to show that the administrative or arbitral determination was sufficiently court-like to
rebut the presumption against applying the doctrine to such decisions. See infra note 212
and accompanying text.
141. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823
(1984).
142. Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d
54 (1985).
143. Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985).
144. See generally Morgan, Playing by the Rules: Due Process and Errors of State Pro-
cedural Law, 63 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 17-24 (1985).
145. See generally C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 81, at 540-44 (1976).
146. See Heim v. Regan, 90 A.D.2d 656, 657, 456 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (3d Dep't 1982);
N.Y. A.P.A., § 305 (McKinney 1984) ("Each agency having power to conduct adjudica-
tory proceedings may adopt rules providing for discovery and depositions to the extent
and in the manner appropriate to its proceedings." (emphasis added)); infra note 188 and
accompanying text.
147. See N.Y. A.P.A. § 305 (McKinney 1984); supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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law. It is, therefore, questionable whether the full and fair opportunity
test can be satisfied absent this procedure in the prior proceeding.
Administrative tribunals are not bound by the rules of evidence.'48
Rules of evidence define what is relevant and privileged in court proceed-
ings; hearsay testimony is prohibited the plaintiff's burden of proof is
measured by the preponderance of evidence standard, and the judicial
and fact-finding roles are clearly differentiated.' 49 Thus, at administra-
tive or arbitral hearings, an issue may be decided on the basis of evidence
that would be inadmissible or insufficient in a court of law.
To the extent that notions of efficiency and reduction of caseloads in-
evitably conflict with concepts of fairness and substantial justice for the
individual litigant, the nature of this conflict differs between judicial fo-
rums and administrative or arbitral forums. Justice and fairness in judi-
cial forums are viewed in terms of formal rituals supervised by an
impartial and independent judiciary. 5 ° These rituals are governed by
rules of evidence and procedure and by case law. Justice and fairness in
administrative and arbitral forums, however, have traditionally been
viewed in terms of permitting citizens access to a simplified, expedited
and informal dispute resolution system.' 5 ' Indeed, elaborate pre-trial
discovery and lengthy evidentiary hearings with technical rules of evi-
dence are often inimical to achieving administrative and arbitral
justice. 152
Many hearing officers and administrative law judges are employed by
the same agencies that promulgate the regulations that these officials are
supposed to be applying in an impartial manner. Unlike judicial forums,
agencies have tasks other than resolving judicial disputes.' Thus,
148. See N.Y. A.P.A. § 306 (McKinney 1984) (administrative tribunals not bound by
the rules of evidence); supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
149. See Schwartz, Administrative Law §§ 7.1, 7.2, 7.7-.10 (2d ed. 1984); Abramson,
Administrative Procedures for Resolving Complex Policy Questions: a Proposal for Proof
Dissection, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 1086, 1096 (1983).
150. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 837, 852-54 (1984).
151. See The APA, supra note 25, at 339 n.8. See also California Dep't of Human
Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 135 (1971) (objective of Congress in creating the
system for unemployment insurance was "getting money into the pocket of the unem-
ployed worker at the earliest point that is administratively feasible."); The Record, supra
note 24, at 740-42 ("Promptness in meeting the financial needs of the unemployed has
always-and properly-been a critical concern of the unemployment insurance
system.").
152. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-92 (1984) (because of
deficiencies in arbitral fact finding, court refused to give preclusive effect to arbitration
awards in § 1983 actions); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974)
(informal procedures of arbitrations insufficient to protect federal rights). Cf. California
Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 135 (1970) (purpose of unemploy-
ment compensation hearing is getting money as quickly as possible to the unemployed
worker at the earliest point that is administratively feasible); N.Y. A.P.A. § 100 (McKin-
ney 1984) (APA provides for simple, uniform procedures).
153. Gifford, The New York State Administrative Procedure Act. Some Reflections
Upon Its Structure and Legislative History, 26 Buffalo L. Rev. 589, 614-20 (1977) (agency
tasks include, inter alia, rulemaking, setting rates, and granting licenses).
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agency determinations are influenced by the policies, aims, personalities,
and sources of power sustaining the agency. 154 This, again, raises the
question of whether the full and fair opportunity standard permits grant-
ing preclusive effect to such determinations on a wholesale basis.
B. The Minimization of Inconsistent Judgments
The belief that society desires to minimize inconsistent decisions is a
significant historical justification for issue preclusion.' 55 Courts have,
however, permitted the relitigation of issue determinations in subsequent
actions, despite the risk of inconsistent results, on the grounds of sub-
stantial justice and fairness. 56 Indeed, the Court of Appeals has stressed
that issue preclusion should not be applied when circumstances exist
that, although not legal impediments, may have the practical effect of
discouraging or deterring a party from fully litigating an issue.15 7 The
court has further stated that the invocation of issue preclusion should
depend on the context in which the disputed facts were considered." 8
By emphasizing that "other circumstances" may cause facts in one pro-
ceeding to have different meanings and consequences in another setting,
the court has shown that concern about placing inconsistent duties on a
party is more a function of claim preclusion than issue preclusion.5 9
154. See Heflin, A Question of Independence, 19 New Eng. L. Rev. 693, 694 (1984)
("[s]ubtle forms of influence also exist, including budget control and assignment of office
space by the agency"); Levinson, The Proposed Administrative Law Judge Corps: An In-
complete But Important Reform Effort, 19 New Eng. L. Rev. 733, 734-35 (1984). But see
The APA, supra note 25, at 350 nn.67-68 (in most respects ALJs are independent of the
agency that employs them).
155. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65
N.Y.2d 449, 455, 482 N.E.2d 63, 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985) ("[Issue preclusion] is
a doctrine intended to reduce litigation and conserve the resources of the court and liti-
gants and it is based upon the general notion that it is not fair to permit a party to
relitigate an issue that has already been decided against it.").
156. See Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52, 57, 427 N.E.2d 104, 107, 444
N.Y.S.2d 585, 588 (1981) (issue of driver's negligence allowed to be relitigated); Gilberg
v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (1981) (be-
cause issue preclusion is rooted in fairness, "there are few immutable rules"); People v.
Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (1980) ("The
doctrine [issue preclusion], however, is not to be rigidly or mechanically applied and
must on occasion, yield to more fundamental concerns.").
157. See People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 417 N.E.2d 518, 522, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224,
228 (1980).
158. See id.
159. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26 (1982). The Restatement (Second)
points out that "[t]here is a close relationship between the definition of a 'claim' and the
sweep of the rule of issue preclusion." Id. at 250. It notes:
Courts laboring under a narrow view of the dimensions of a claim may on occa-
sion have expanded concepts of issue preclusion in order to avoid relitigation of
what is essentially the same dispute. Under a transaction approach to the con-
cept of a claim, on the other hand, there is less need to rely on issue preclusion
to put an end to the litigation of a particular controversy.
Id.
Thus since the Court of Appeals' adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Judge-
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In Gilberg v. Barbieri,"6 the Court of Appeals held that a harassment
conviction would not preclude relitigation of the same material issue in a
civil lawsuit, despite the possibility of an inconsistent determination of
the issue."' The Gilberg court held that because the parties could not
foresee that the conviction would later be used to establish conclusive
liability in a $250,000 personal injury suit, they were not accorded a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.1 62 The court also emphasized
the brisk and informal manner of the prior hearing and observed that the
defendant had neither the opportunity nor the incentive to litigate as
thoroughly as he might have if the stakes had been greater.'63 This deci-
sion is consistent both with earlier cases refusing to grant issue preclusion
when a party could not foresee that the issue would arise in subsequent
litigation, 1" and with the Court of Appeals decision in Koch Y. Consoli-
dated Edison Co.,165 where issue preclusion was granted on the grounds
that the defendant should have foreseen that the same issue determina-
tion in an earlier proceeding would be conclusive in later actions.1 6'
ments' "transactional analysis" approach in Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 29-30, 379
N.E.2d 172, 175-76, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (1978), it follows that the application of issue
preclusion should be restricted, see also O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357,
429 N.E.2d 1158,1159, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (1981) (approving transactional analysis).
See Chase, Trends and Cross Trends in Res Judicata, N.Y.L.J., May 25, 1982, at 2, col. 4.
160. 53 N.Y.2d 285, 423 N.E.2d 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981).
161. Id. at 294, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The Court of Appeals framed
the issue as "[W]hether a conviction for the petty offense of harassment can later be used
to preclude the defendant from disputing the merits of a civil suit for assault, involving
the same incident and seeking a quarter of a million dollars." Id. at 288, 423 N.E.2d at
807, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 49. A divided Court of Appeals refused to give conclusive effect to
the prior determination beyond the proceeding in which it was made. See id. at 292, 423
N.E.2d at 809, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 51. The majority found that the defendant was afforded
neither an opportunity nor an incentive to litigate the harassment conviction thoroughly
or as thoroughly as he might have if more were at stake. See id. at 293, 423 N.E.2d at
810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The court noted that a contrary ruling would encourage civil
litigants to file criminal complaints which would frustrate the very purpose of res judi-
cata. See id. at 294, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The court also observed that
future parties would be compelled to defend minor criminal charges with a vigor out of
proportion to the charge and at variance with the proper function of the local criminal
courts. See id., 423 N.E.2d at 810, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
162. See id., 423 N.E.2d at 810, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
163. See id. at 293, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. Set, also Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979) (it may be unfair to permit offensive use of collat-
eral estoppel if defendant in first action was sued for nominal or small damages and
subsequent lawsuit is unforeseeable because he may not have incentive to '*defend
vigorously").
164. See O'Conner v. G & R Packing Co., 53 N.Y.2d 278, 283, 423 N.E.2d 397, 399,
440 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1981) (trial court did not examine foreseeability of later preclu-
sion and thus its determination that plaintiff was contributorily negligent was not specifi-
cally decided); Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52, 56, 429 N.E.2d 104. 106, 444
N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (1981) ("The test of a full and fair opportunity to litigate is designed to
assure that the party against whom collateral estoppel is being invoked has had an oppor-
tunity to present his case.").
165. 62 N.Y.2d 548, 468 N.E.2d 1, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1984). cert. denied. 105 S. Ct.
1177 (1985).
166. Id. at 557, 468 N.E.2d at 6, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 168 (Court of Appeals held that the
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It is difficult to reconcile the court's decisions denying preclusive effect
to issue determinations made at hearings when either the stakes were
minimal or the procedures overly informal, and its decisions granting
preclusive effect to administrative and arbitral determinations. 67 In Gil-
berg v. Barbieri, for example, there was more at stake and Barbieri had as
much reason to litigate in the City Court as Brugman, Clemens or Ryan
did to litigate in their respective administrative and arbitral forums. 68
In addition, Barbieri had greater procedural benefits than Ryan,
Brugman, or Clemens. 69 Neither Brugman nor Clemens had any ad-
versarial hearing before binding issue determinations were made against
them by non-lawyers.17 Although Ryan had a hearing, he was not rep-
resented by an attorney nor did he benefit from pretrial discovery or
technical rules of evidence.
17
'
Most people seek administrative and arbitral relief without contem-
plating legal action or the preclusive impact that a nonjudicial issue de-
termination will have on their right to litigate a claim in a court of
law. 172 In cases such as Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 173 where the
court found the subsequent action foreseeable, 74 the parties were sophis-
ticated litigants with access to expert counsel, and, thus, could foresee
that the earlier issue determination could act as a bar in a subsequent
proceeding. Administrative forums are intended as places where parties
full and fair opportunity requirement was satisfied because the defendant "recognizing
the potential preclusive effects of an adverse determination in that case, had every incen-
tive to defend that action fully and vigorously.").
167. See The Record, supra note 24, at 746.
168. Barbieri, charged with harassment, see N.Y. Penal Law § 240.25(5) (McKinney
1985) (harassment is a violation), and if convicted faced a possible fifteen day jail sen-
tence. See N.Y. Penal Law § 70.15(4) (McKinney 1975). In contrast, Clemens sought
approximately $1,700 in medical fees. See Clemens v. Apple, 102 A.D.2d 236, 237, 477
N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (3d Dep't 1984), aff'd, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d
20 (1985). Brugman sought partial disability, see Record on Appeal at 50-51, 56,
Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54
(1985). The benefits sought by Ryan were minimal. See supra notes 93-102 and accompa-
nying text; see also The Record, supra note 24, at 746 (Barbieri faced a fifteen day jail
sentence if convicted of harassment, while the average unemployment award, such as that
sought by Ryan, is roughly $1500).
169. Barbieri had the right to a court appointed attorney if he had been unable to
afford one, see generally W.R. LaFave & J.H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.4 (1985)
(criminal defendants have right to counsel); findings of fact must have been established
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at § 1.4(n).
170. See generally Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 20
(1985); Brugman v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d
54 (1985).
171. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
172. See The Record, supra note 24, at 743 ("It is unlikely that most claimants, even
those who may ultimately bring a charge or suit relating to their discharges, know at the
time they file for unemployment benefits that there will be future litigation or that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel may impinge on such later proceeding.").
173. Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 468 N.E.2d 1, 479 N.Y.S.2d
163 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1177 (1985).
174. Id. at 557. 468 N.E.2d at 6, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
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can have their claims processed without hiring a lawyer or incurring
other expenses. 17 5 Custom suggests that lay representation is more suc-
cessful than representation by an attorney in administrative and arbitral
forums.17 6 It is likely that indigent litigants in administrative and arbi-
tral forums will favor lay representation that may be insensitive to the
effect of issue determinations on subsequent litigation. Thus, courts
should be wary of granting such determinations preclusive effect. If not,
parties may be forced, in effect, to forego small claims because they can-
not afford legal counsel to litigate administrative issues, that may later be
decisive in unanticipated lawsuits.
Although disputed factual issues may arise from the same transaction
or occurrence, it is important to recognize that they may be developed
differently in a judicial forum than in an administrative or arbitral hear-
ing. Pre-trial discovery, evidentiary objections at trial, artful cross-exam-
ination, and a skillful summation before a jury may logically lead to a
decision in a court of law that is justifiably inconsistent with a decision
made by an administrative hearing officer or a panel of arbitrators. Thus,
general policy notions of inconsistency, which courts have not hesitated
to disregard in interforum matters, are of little importance when deciding
if an administrative or arbitral determination should be conclusive in a
judicial forum.'77
C. Finality and the Conservation of Resources
In Ryan v. New York Telephone Co.,' 78 the Court of Appeals primarily
relied on the concept of finality to justify its holding that an administra-
175. 0. Chase, supra note 17, at § 31.01 (1986). See generally Gellhorn & Benjamin,
Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York 326-68 (1942) (administrative ac-
tion may be pursued without an attorney); Note, Rabbinical Courts: Modern Day Solo-
mons, 6 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 49, 69 (1970) (alternative resources provide
inexpensive forums for dispute resolution).
176. Report by the New York Assembly Standing Committee on Labor (Frank J.
Barbaro, Chairman), Due Process in the Unemployment Insurance System in New York
State, 7 (1981) (available in the files of Fordham Law Review (citing 1979 study con-
ducted by National Commission on Unemployment Compensation which indicates how
infrequently parties in fact obtain counsel); see also N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Reg. tit. 12
§ 462.4(c) (statutory restrictions on payment of attorney fees).
177. This observation is qualified when issue preclusion is given to the determination
of one agency to preclude relitigation of a decisive issue before another agency which has
similar procedural rules. See Mallia v. Webb, 103 A.D.2d 559, 563, 481 N.Y.S.2d 805,
808 (3d Dep't 1984) (earlier determination, on application for aid to dependent children
benefits, was entitled to preclusive effect in determining subsequent eligibility for food
stamps). On the other hand, when administrative forums have substantially different pro-
cedural rules, the doctrine has not been applied. See. e.g., Manhasset Bd. of Educ. v.
N.Y.S. Human Rights, 106 A.D.2d 364, 366, 482 N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (2d Dep't 1984)
(preclusive effect not given to prior administration because complainants' allegation that
she had been subjected to a racial slur was only briefly explored there.); see also Willer v.
New York State Bd. of Regents, 101 A.D.2d 937, 937, 475 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (3d Dep't
1984) (preclusive effect not given because prior administrative hearing did not give peti-
tioner full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim).
178. 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984).
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tive issue determination precluded relitigation of the same decisive issue
in a judicial forum. 79 The court found support for granting preclusive
effect to an administrative determination" 0 in Evans v. Monaghan 18, and
In re Venes. 182 In these decisions, the court emphasized that finality was
the fundamental justification for claim preclusion in an admininstrative
context, stating that "[s]ecurity of person and property requires that de-
terminations in the field of administrative law should be given as much
finality as is reasonably possible."' 18 3 Neither case, however, involved the
question of whether an administrative finding on which its determination
rested, should preclude litigation of the same decisive issue in a judicial
forum. Thus, the Ryan court, in citing these cases as support for apply-
ing issue preclusion relied on dicta. Issues do not have independent sig-
nificance in the sense that claims do.' 8 4 Issue preclusion differs from
claim preclusion in that it merely prohibits, in the interest of fairness,'
the subsequent litigation of some, but not necessarily all, prior adjudi-
cated issues. 186
It is crucial to note that the principle of finality and the related need to
conserve judicial resources evolved as justifications for issue preclusion in
the context of judicial proceedings.18 7 Administrative and arbitral fo-
rums resolve disputed issues with less stringent procedural safeguards
than judicial proceedings which include pre-trial discovery, lengthy evi-
dentiary hearings and technical rules of evidence. 8 Justice in adminis-
179. Id. at 499-500, 467 N.E.2d at 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 826 ("'Justice requires that
every cause be once fairly and impartially tried; but the public tranquillity demands that,
having been once so tried, all litigation of that question, and between those parties, should
be closed forever.' ") (quoting Fish v. Vanderlip, 218 N.Y. 29, 36-37, 112 N.E. 425, 427-
28 (1916) (quoting Greenleaf, Evidence, §§ 522-23)).
180. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 467 N.E.2d 487, 489-90, 478
N.Y.2d 823, 825-26 (1984).
181. 306 N.Y. 312, 118 N.E.2d 452 (1954).
182. 43 N.Y.2d 520, 373 N.E.2d 987, 402 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1978).
183. Id. at 524, 373 N.E.2d at 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (quoting Evans v. Monaghan,
306 N.Y. 312, 323-24, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-58 (1954)).
184. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
185. The primary policy justification for issue preclusion has traditionally rested on
society's belief that it is unfair for courts to permit a party who has unsuccessfully as-
serted one position in a particular matter to relitigate that assertion (or a consistent asser-
tion) in a later proceeding based upon the same facts. See supra notes 13-16 and
accompanying text; see also Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 467 N.E.2d
487, 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984) ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel [issue pre-
clusion], a narrower species of resjudicata, precludes a party from relitigating in a subse-
quent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding .... .
186. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
187. See Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 523, 373 N.E.2d 987, 988,
402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808-09 (1978) ("Resjudicata is a doctrine associated with dispute-
resolution.... Its application to administrative proceedings is remarkably elusive, for it
has in large part been developed not in decisions applying resjudicata to administrative
adjudications, but rather by courts which ... found the doctrine inapplicable to the cases
before them.").
188. See Sinha v. Ambach, 91 A.D.2d 703, 457 N.Y.S.2d 603 (3d Dep't 1982) ("Due
process considerations do not require the full panoply of procedural tools available to
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trative and arbritral forums has traditionally been viewed in terms of
permitting citizens access to a simplified and informal dispute system
that expeditiously resolves conflicts. 8 9 The procedural safeguards are
often inimical to acheiving administrative and arbitral justice. The ab-
sence of these procedures, however, increases the possibility "that grave
errors may go uncorrected."'' 90 Thus, reliance on finality as a primary
policy justification for the application of issue preclusion to administra-
tive and arbitral determinations is misplaced. Although the notion that
some administrative decisions should be considered final in order to re-
lieve the judicial system of adjudicating certain disputes is reasonable, it
should not apply when a different result is possible because the second
forum affords a party procedural opportunities unavailable in the first. I9 I
The aim of conserving judicial resources is furthered by both accord-
ing finality to subordinate court decisions and reducing incentives to ap-
peal.' 92 Granting preclusive effect to arbitral and administrative
determinations, however, may compel a party to appeal in anticipation of
subsequent litigation in which the issue determined will assume greater
importance.'93 The Court of Appeals has given little guidance for deter-
mining when decisions of administrative agencies and arbitral tribunals
will have preclusive consequences in other actions.' 94 Thus, litigants,
will be compelled to dedicate resources to contest simple matters for fear
that issues decided against them will be given estoppel effect in a subse-
quent lawsuit. Parties appearing before administrative and arbitral bod-
ies will make increased discovery demands. There will be a reluctance by
many parties to arbitrate unless there is a stipulation limiting the preclu-
sive effect of the award. Although caseloads may be reuced, the practical
effect is that dispute resolution resources will not be conserved. Rather,
they will be re-allocated to administrative and arbitral forums. Treating
civil litigants in an administrative proceeding."); Heim v. Regan, 90 A.D.2d 656, 657,
456 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (3d Dep't 1982) (not necessary to apply discovery rules, as embod-
ied in CPLR article 31 to administrative hearings).
189. See Goldstein, supra note 25, at 69-70 (congestion of courts and complexity of
civil litigation support development of alternative forums); 3 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A.
Miller, New York Civil Practice 3031.01 (1986) (imperfection of judicial process may
be resolved through creation of alternative forums); 3 N. Y Judicial Conference Report
94-97 (1958) (the imperfections of the judicial system most frequently noted as reasons
for the movement away from the courts are: (1) crowded calendars and attendant delay;
(2) limitations on the scope of permissible evidence because of the exclusionary rules
applied by the courts; (3) protracted trials; (4) unwanted publicity; harrassment of wit-
nesses during cross-examination; (5) lack of confidence in the ability of judges to deter-
mine disputes; and (6) high cost of counsel fees resulting from the length of the litigation
process).
190. 3 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 189, 3031.01.
191. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979) ("Still another situa-
tion where it might be unfair to apply offensive estoppel is where the second action af-
fords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could
readily cause a different result.").
192. Hazard, supra note 9, at 91 (1984).
193. Id.
194. See The Record, supra note 24, at 744-48.
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administrative and arbitral determinations as final for purposes of issue
preclusion may ultimately conflict with the need to conserve resources.
In addition, when courts make these issue determinations decisive in an
administrative or arbitral forum, they surrender their authority to a hid-
den judiciary. 195 An independent judiciary may be compromised when its
authority is diffused and re-allocated under the banner of conserving re-
sources and reducing caseloads.
IV. WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE OR ARBITRAL ISSUE
DETERMINATION SHOULD PRECLUDE RELITIGATION OF
THE SAME DECISIVE ISSUE IN A JUDICIAL
FORUM
Government services in New York are provided by 56 federal agencies,
133 state departments and agencies, 62 counties, 62 districts, 5383 special
districts, 2202 public authorities, 122 urban renewal agencies, and 104
industrial development agencies.196 Most of these agencies have special-
ized functions and make regulatory and adjudicative determinations 197
that are regulated by the New York State Administrative Procedures
Act("A.P.A.").19 s Thus, if the purpose of our judicial system is to re-
195. See Clemens v. Apple, 65 N.Y.2d 746, 481 N.E.2d 560, 492 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1985)
(arbitral issue determination given effect by court of law); Brugman v. City of New York,
64 N.Y.2d 1011, 478 N.E.2d 195, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1985) (administrative issue determi-
nation given effect by court of law).
196. New York State Bar Association, New York State Regulatory Reform (Report of
Action Unit No. 5), 54 (1982).
197. Id. at 37.
198. N. Y. A.P.A., (McKinney 1976 amended 1984). This is a uniform code of admin-
istrative adjudications by state agencies. Under A.P.A. an "adjudicatory proceeding"
generally means "any activity which is not a rule making proceeding or an employee
disciplinary action." N.Y. A.P.A. § 102(3) (McKinney 1984). Although Article III of
A.P.A. spells out in detail the elements of an adjudicatory proceeding, it is still frequently
difficult to differentiate between rule-making determinations and adjudicative determina-
tions. Adjudicative proceedings are those in which a determination of the legal rights,
duties or privileges of named parties thereto is required by law to be made only on a
record and after an opportunity for a hearing. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments § 83, Comment (b) (1982); Abramson, supra note 149, at 1096-98 (1983); Maines,
Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort or Products Liability Cases: The Potential for
Corporate Catastrophe from Prior Administrative Proceedings, 5 Admin. L. Rev. 327, 345
(1983). It is generally clear that adjudicatory action involves the resolution of disputed
issues of past conduct while legislative agency action involves the fashioning of prospec-
tive rules to govern future conduct. See Maines, supra, at 345 (citing K. Davis, 2 Admin-
istrative L. Treatise, § 18.08, at 597 (1958)).
Article III of A.P.A. is entitled "Adjudicatory Proceedings." Its provisions, which
relate to (1) hearings, (2) the record, (3) presiding officer, (4) powers of presiding officers,
(5) disclosure, (6) evidence and (7) decisions, determinations and orders, are made appli-
cable to "any department, board, bureau, commission, division, office, council, committee
or officer of the state, or a public benefit corporation or public authority... authorized by
law to make ... final decisions in adjudicatory proceedings. . ." N.Y. A.P.A. § 102(l)
(McKinney 1984). Article III is not applicable to "agencies in the legislative and judicial
branches, agencies created by interstate compact. . ., the state insurance fund, the unem-
ployment insurance appeal board and the workers' compensation board .. ." Id. Nor
does it apply to "an administrative tribunal created by statute to hear or determine allega-
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solve disputes, and if principles of issue preclusion further this goal by
preventing the relitigation of issue determinations, 199 it is consistent with
the purposes of the doctrine to apply it, when appropriate, to administra-
tive rulings in order to relieve courts of the burden of resolving certain
disputes.2" If every administrative dispute could be re-litigated in court,
many agency proceedings would be unnecessarily duplicated.2"' These
concerns also apply to arbitration awards, which resolve many disputes
tions of traffic infractions..." See id. § 102(3). New York State agencies subject to
A.P.A. are required to "adopt rules governing the procedures on adjudicatory proceed-
ings and appeals ... [and to] prepare a summary of such proceedings in plain language,"
id. § 301(3), which shall be made available to the public on request. See id. These agency
"adjudicatory procedures" provide that all parties be given an opportunity for a hearing
within reasonable time. See N.Y. A.P.A. § 301(1) (McKinney 1984). Reasonable notice
of the hearing includes:
(a) a statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing; (b) a statement of
the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; (c) a
reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved, where
possible; (d) a short and plain statement of matters asserted.
Id. § 301(2). These procedures afford all parties participating in the hearing an "opportu-
nity to present written argument on issues of law and an opportunity to present evidence"
before an impartial hearing officer. Id. § 301(4). The officer can "[a]dminister oaths and
affirmations," Id. § 304(1), "[s]ign and issue subpoenas in the name of the agency," id.
§ 304(2), "[p]rovide for the taking of testimony by deposition," id. § 304(3), "[rlegulate
the course of the hearings, "id. § 304(4), and actively promote "simplification of the issues
by consent of the parties." Id. § 304(5). Agencies may, but are not specifically required
to, "adopt rules providing for discovery and depositions." Id. § 305. All evidence on
which the agency will rely including records and documents in its possession are usually
offered and made a part of the record. Id. § 306(2). This record must be a "complete
record" of the entire proceeding. Id. § 302(2). It is similar, in many respects, to records
made at the trial level in the court system and includes "findings of fact" which are based
exclusively on the evidence presented to the hearing officer. Unless otherwise provided
by any statute, agencies need not observe the formal rules of evidence applicable in the
courts and may, when appropriate, permit submission of all or part of the evidence in
written form. See id. § 306(4). Parties have the right of cross-examination, but the hear-
ing officer has discretion to exclude irrelevant or "unduly repetitious evidence or cross-
examination may be excluded." Id § 306(1). "[T]he burden of proof [is generally] upon
the party who initiated the proceeding." Id § 306(1). For a discussion of the contro-
versy over the adoption of A.P.A. see Gifford, The New York State Administrative Proce-
dure Act: Some Reflections Upon Its Structure and Legislative History, 26 Buffalo L. Rev.
589 (1977).
199. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
200. This is particularly true in New York, where over twenty percent of the nation's
lawsuits are filed and where the annual number of cases disposed of by the state's courts
is ten times the number of cases disposed of each year by the entire federal judiciary. See
Remarks by Honorable Sol Wachler, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, before Annual
Dinner of the New York State Bar Association, January 17, 1986 (available in the files of
Fordham Law Review).
201. See Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 323, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457 (1954) ("deter-
minations in the field of administrative law should be given as much finality as is reason-
ably possible."); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83 comment b (1982) ("the social
importance of stability in the results of [administrative and arbitral] decisions corre-
sponds to the importance of stability in judicial judgments"). But see SCM Corp. v.
Fisher Park Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 793, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028, 390 N.Y.S.2d 398,
403 (1976) (arbitral awards should not have the precedential value of judicial
determinations).
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that would otherwise burden the courts.202
Litigants in administrative and arbitral proceedings are free to hire
counsel and in some instances benefit from adjudicatory rules of discov-
ery and evidence that are similar to those available in courts of law.203
Ideally, justice in these forums is fairly and efficiently administered by
experts in the relevant area of law .21 In addition, judicial review of ad-
ministrative determinations of arbitral awards is available under New
York law.20 5 Thus, if an administrative or arbitral issue determination is
quasi-judicial in nature °6 and if it is subject to judicial appellate review,
202. D. Siegel, supra note 2, § 456 (1978) ("Any other conclusion would undermine
the important and expanding arbitration process . . . ") (footnote omitted).
203. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. See generally Schwartz, Administra-
tive Law, 30 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 7 (1979). The minimal procedural standards are set
forth in N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7506 (McKinney 1980). These are, basically, that the
arbitrator be sworn to decide the disputed issues fairly, see id. § 7506(a) and that each
party have notice, see id. an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses,
see id. at § 7506(b), and be represented by an attorney. See id. at § 7506(d); see also SCM
Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 792-793, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028, 390
N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1976) (discussing procedures at arbitration).
204. See Siegel v. Lewis, 40 N.Y.2d 687, 689-90, 358 N.E.2d 484, 485-86, 389
N.Y.S.2d 800, 802 (1976) (arbitrator's expertise may be desireable to one of parties);
Palmer, The Evolving Role of Administrative Law Judges, 19 New Eng. L. Rev. 755, 755
(1983-84) (administrative judiciary should be composed of experts).
205. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. §§ 7511, 7803 (McKinney 1980). To be final, an
administrative determination must not be subject to appellate review by the agency or to
judicial review under article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules. See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 83 comment a, § 84, 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A.
Miller, supra note 96, at §§ 75.01, 78.01, 78.04 (g). See generally D. Siegel, supra note
123, at 1 (discussing application of issue preclusion to administrative and arbitral
determinations).
206. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 467 N.E.2d 487, 489, 478
N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1984) ("At the outset, it should be made clear that the doctrines of res
judicata [claim preclusion] and collateral estoppel [issue preclusion] are applicable to give
conclusive effect to the quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies.") (cita-
tions omitted). Thus, if the issue is determined at a tribunal which has the power to
conduct a hearing and decide an issue, see 8 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra
note 96, § 7803.11 (factors used when classifying action as administrative or quasi-judi-
cial), whether it is a board, commission, agency or other body, it is "entitled to the same
treatment that a duly rendered judicial judgment gets." D. Siegel, supra note 2, § 456, at
603 (1978). In such instances, issue preclusion will be permitted if not incompatible with
legislative policy. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 83(4), 84(3) (1982). Other
general limitations are suggested by the Restatement (Second). See id. §§ 83 comment h,
84 comment f.
Courts often have difficulty in defining the term quasi-judicial, usually viewing it in
terms of the nature of the precise power being exercised by the administrative agency.
See, e.g., Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 524-25, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989,
402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978) (issue preclusion not applied to determination by school
board because it was not, in terms of the precise power being exercised, a quasi-judicial
decision); Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 324, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-58 (1954) ("Such
departures from the rule as there may be in administrative law appear to spring from the
peculiar necessities of the particular case or the nature of the precise power being exer-
cised, rather than from any general distinction between courts and administrative tribu-
nals."); Turner Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 57 A.D.2d 201, 204, 394 N.Y.S.2d 78,
81 (3d Dep't 1977) (Tax commission determination would not be given preclusive effect
in later judicial action because it was ministerial in light of the -'necessities of the partic-
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it is reasonable to preclude relitigation of the same decisive issue in a
judicial forum. However, if the peculiar necessities of a case and the na-
ture of the precise administrative or arbitral power involved indicate that
a decision was not made in a quasi-judicial, adversarial setting with a full
and fair hearing, then the doctrine should not be applied in subsequent
judicial action.2 "7
It should be recognized that the typical justifications for giving preclu-
sive effect to administrative and arbitral determinations should have lim-
ited application in judicial proceedings.2"' "The vagaries of the
administrative process"2 9 under The New York State Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA") and the informality of arbitration proceedings
argue against the Court of Appeals' decision that administrative and ar-
bitral determinations should be given preclusive effect in judicial pro-
ceedings.21 Rather, before applying the doctrine of issue preclusion to
administrative and arbitral determinations, courts should permit the
party seeking to avoid preclusion to show factors which can raise a rebut-
table presumption that the non-judicial determination be denied preclu-
sive effect.21" ' Although a decision to grant issue preclusion needs to be
decided on the specific circumstances of each case, such factors should
include, inter alia: (1) the existence of admissible evidence, unavailable at
the previous hearing (because, for example, full disclosure was not avail-
able, tending to support the position of the party defending against pre-
clusion); (2) a showing that the party defending against preclusion was
denied the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses,
or that the effectiveness of such presentation and cross-examination was
ular case or the nature of the precise power being exercised' ") (quoting Evans, 306 N.Y.
at 324, 118 N.E.2d at 457-58).
207. See Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 524, 373 N.F2d 987, 989,
402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978) ("the doctrine should be applied to some administrative
proceedings, modified for some, and rejected for others") (quoting K. Davis, Adminis-
trative L. Treatise § 18.10, at 371 (3d ed. 1972)). In Venes, the court also directed that
"[b]efore applying the doctrine of resjudicata to an administrative determination, it is
necessary to determine whether to do so would be consistent with the function of the
administrative agency involved .... " id., 373 N.E.2d at 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 809, and
that the doctrine "is to be applied to an agency determination only if such application is
consistent with the nature of the particular administrative adjudication." Id., 373 N.E.2d
at 989, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
208. See supra Part III.
209. Cf. Perschbacher, supra note 138, at 459 (discussing federal administrative
proceedings).
210. See supra Part III, notes 147-48 and accompanying text. Cf. Perschbacher, supra
note 138, at 459 (discussing the federal court system).
211. Cf. Perschbacher, supra note 138, at 459 (discussing the federal court system).
This is contrary to the approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982)
§ 83(1) that is based on the assumption that "proof-taking in an administrative or arbitra-
tion tribunal may be relatively informal but may nevertheless permit the parties to pres-
ent substantially the same evidence that might be adduced through the more formal
procedures characteristic of courts." Id., §§ 83-87 introductory note at 265. This as-
sumption lacks merit because judges can seldom verify the impact of evidence that was
not admitted or considered.
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severely limited by the presiding officer at the non-judicial forum or be-
cause the evidence was inadmissible under the rules of that forum; and
(3) a showing that the party was not represented by an attorney in the
previous action. When this presumption is raised on the ground of the
existence of new evidence, the party seeking to invoke preclusion may
rebut by showing that the sum of the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the party defending against preclusion, could not support an
alternate finding. Similarly, when the presumption is raised on the
ground of a denial of the opportunity to present evidence and cross-ex-
amine witnesses or the severe limitation of this opportunity, the party
seeking to invoke preclusion must demonstrate that such opportunity
would not have resulted in a different determination. Finally, when the
party defending against preclusion has raised this presumption by show-
ing that he was not represented by an attorney, the party seeking preclu-
sion may successfully rebut it by demonstrating either (a) that the
defending party was fully aware of the possible preclusive effect of the
earlier determination (such as by showing that the judicial action was
commenced prior to the one in the non-judicial forum) and that the party
was afforded an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine wit-
nesses; or (b) that the party had both the opportunity to present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses and that the evidence on which the non-
judicial determination was based was sufficiently reliable to be admitted
in a judicial action.
The application of issue preclusion should not circumvent the legisla-
tive intent of APA which mandates expeditious administrative proceed-
ings."' 2 Issue preclusion should neither interfere with the equitable
administration of laws213 nor conflict with legislative policy that determi-
nations of non-judicial bodies should not be accorded conclusive effect in
subsequent court proceedings.2 14
It does not perforce that denying preclusive effect to arbitral and ad-
ministrative decisions will render these determinations meaningless. Ad-
ministrative and arbitral findings would be admissible as evidence in
subsequent court proceedings subject to the usual rules of evidence. 215
212. See N.Y. A.P.A. § 100 (McKinney 1984) (the purpose of the Act is to provide
people with simple uniform procedures).
213. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(3)(4) (1982); The Record, supra note 24,
at 739 ("The Purpose and Nature of Unemployment Insurance Proceedings").
214. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(4)(a) (1982).
215. A similar approach is followed in federal Title VII litigation. See Perschbacher,
supra note 138 at 461 nn. 182-83. Determinations of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission are admissible as evidence. Id. In addition, administrative agencies usually
admit the record and findings of fact in earlier related proceedings as evidence at subse-
quent hearings. See N.Y. A.P.A. § 306(2) (McKinney 1984) (all evidence in possession
of agency may be made part of record). The New York courts should adopt a related
process. Thus any adverse statement made by a witness under oath at an administrative
or arbitration hearing can be used to impeach his credibility in a court of law. See 5 J.
Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 2, at § 4514 (1985) (impeachment of witness
by prior inconsistent statement).
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ISSUE PRECLUSION
This approach would permit many findings of fact to be used for im-
peachment purposes without encouraging courts to extend the doctrine
of issue preclusion by what Professor Currie refers to as the "logical
processes of manipulation."2 16
Finally, the legislature should enact rules that limit the preclusive ef-
fect of some findings of fact or law made by administrative agencies and
arbitral tribunals.2" 7 Indeed, issue preclusion does not apply to decisions
in minor cases such as small claims actions2"' because as the Court of
Appeals has pointed out, "[t]he brisk, often informal way in which these
matters must be tried, as well as the relative insignificance of the out-
come, afford the party neither opportunity nor incentive to litigate thor-
oughly or as thoroughly as he might if more were at stake."2 9 Thus,
because preclusive effect cannot be applied to informal judicial proceed-
ings, the same logic should be true for most administrative and arbitra-
tion hearings.
CONCLUSION
There is great emphasis today on the development of alternative dis-
pute resolutions such as arbitration and administrative adjudication. 2 °
These procedures provide our citizens with efficient and inexpensive ac-
cess to justice. Our society also has a strong but not unequivocal interest
in seeing that things judicially decided stay decided. While the doctrines
of claim preclusion and issue preclusion have been used to achieve this
goal, the Court of Appeals has required that their application to judicial
determinations be balanced with fundamental notions of fairness."'
Denying issue preclusion to administrative and arbitral determinations
216. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan.
L. Rev. 281, 289 (1957).
217. See The Record, supra note 24, at 748-49 (1985). A similar result is suggested by
Professor Abramson, who urges that A.P.A. be amended to assure informed decision
making. See Abramson, supra note 144, at 1096-98 (1983).
218. See N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act § 1808 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986) ("A judgment
obtained under this article may be pleaded as res judicata only as to the amount involved
in the particular action and shall not otherwise be deemed an adjudication of any fact at
issue or found therein in any other action or court."); Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co.,
62 N.Y.2d 548, 556, 468 N.E.2d 1, 5, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 167, (1984), cert. denied, 105
S.Ct. 1177 (1985) (court refuses to give res judicata effect to small claim determination
(citing City Civ. Ct. Act § 1804, 1808)).
219. Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 293, 423 N.E.2d 807, 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49,
52, (1981).
220. See The APA supra note 25, at 355-58; Breger supra note 25, at 951-55; Green,
Marks & Olsen, supra note 25, at 501. See generally Keller, Mini-trial Procedures of the
American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Times Winter 1986, 5; Burger, Chief Jus-
tice Supports Arbitration, Arbitration Times, Fall 1985, 1; Metaxas, Alternatives to Litiga-
tion are Maturing, 8 Nat'l. L. J., May 12, 1986, at 1; Judges End Cases Faster Using Trial
Alternatives, New York Times, Friday January 3, 1986, A-8; Business and the Law" The
Big Debate Over Litigation, N.Y. Times, Tuesday, May 13, 1986, at D-2; Neighborhood
Justice of Chicage - The Success and the Challenge, 18 Dispute Resolution (American Bar
Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution) 1, 16 (Spring 1986).
221. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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will not overwhelm our courts. The judicial time saving that presumably
results by application of the doctrine has been overestimated.222 It will,
however, minimize the potential for unfairness. Administrative and arbi-
tral procedures are substantially different from judicial procedure. By
performing adjudicative and management functions, non-judicial person-
nel serve functions other than the objective and impartial resolution of
disputes. Judges can seldom verify whether these functions comport
with the basic notions of due process that are essential to our judicial
system.223 Hence, issue preclusion should be used only to give conclusive
effect to administrative and arbitral forums in a court of law when the
party seeking to invoke it has established that the full and fair opportu-
nity requirement has been satisfied.
222. See Metaxas, supra note 220, at D-2 (time saving contemplated by alternative
dispute resolution less than anticipated); Motley, Why We are a Nation of Litigators, 6 U.
Bridgeport L. Rev. 9, 17 (litigation tide which currently engulfs us is healthy and has its
roots in American judicial system); Resnik, supra note 150, at 942, n.480 (numbers other
than filing rates must be examined to account for increased litigation.)
223. K. Davis, Administrative Law Text, § 4.02 (3d ed. 1972) ("much informal action
is not even theoretically reviewable and more than ninety-nine percent of what is review-
able is not in fact reviewed").
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